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MILITARY AFFAIRS

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16 September 1982

**USSR REPORT  
MILITARY AFFAIRS**

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## MILITARY SCIENCE, THEORY, STRATEGY

### MILITARY STRENGTH: ESSENCE AND STRUCTURE DISCUSSED

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 7, Apr 82 (signed to press 19 Mar 82) pp 18-25

[Article by Dr of Philosophical Sciences, Prof, Maj Gen N. Tabunov: "National Defense Might: Essence and Structure"]

[Text] The Soviet people need favorable foreign policy conditions for carrying out the vast creative plans outlined by the decisions of the 26th CPSU Congress. Those whose hands cast steel, sow grain, build new cities and create the beautiful should be confident that their labor is securely defended. In carrying out the will of the people, the Communist Party and the Soviet Government have always given and do give unflagging attention to strengthening the nation's defense capability and the might of its Armed Forces. "Our approach to these questions," commented Comrade L.I. Brezhnev, "can be summed up as follows: the defense potential of the Soviet Union should be sufficient so that no one would risk disrupting our peaceful life" ("Leninskij kursom" [by the Leninist Course], volume 6, page 294).

What is the essence of our motherland's defense might? What is its structure? A dependable answer to these questions is not only of theoretical but also direct practical relevance. This is particularly so for the military personnel to whom the party has entrusted the responsible task of further strengthening the combat readiness of the Soviet Armed Forces as the guard of the people's peaceful labor and the bulwark of universal peace.

\* \* \*

By the military might of a state one usually understands the aggregate of its material and spiritual forces which are or can be used for military ends. Since aggressive drives are alien to a socialist state, for describing its military might it is preferable to employ such terms as "defense capability," "defensive power" or "defensive might." In drawing a sharp line between a predatory imperialist war and a revolutionary, proletarian justly democratic war, V. I. Lenin on the eve of Great October spoke about a system of measures which should insure the victory of the socialist revolution and thereby strengthen "defense capability or, in other words, the military might of the nation" (PSS [Complete Collected Works], volume 34, p 94).

Military might is a part of state might. But precisely which? This question has always occupied the minds of political and military leaders. However, the approach to it by the reactionary and progressive leaders has differed. For example, the German Kaiser Wilhelm II, in becoming acquainted with a nation new to him, first asked: "But how many divisions does it have?" The more serious politicians and strategists saw in the divisions only the "end product" of state might. They rather well understood that the offensive and defensive capabilities of any state are determined not merely by the force of the army, but also by such factors as geographic position, size of population, economic development level, the nature of the state system, the presence or absence of allies and so forth.

In preparing for a war, the ruling circles were forced to weigh the capabilities of their own state and their ability to mobilize these in the aim of attaining victory. It is another question that very often these assessments, as history shows, were far from reality and led to adventurism in politics. However, such miscalculations had their source not only in the voluntarism and unsound scheming of the various figures. It is impossible to ignore the objective difficulties involved in a quantitative and qualitative analysis of a state's military might which has a concrete historical, relative, dynamic and multidimensional nature.

The concrete historical, relative nature of military might is determined by a whole series of factors. In particular, these are: the dependents of a state's use of the necessary resources upon the condition of international relations, upon the specific balance of class-political forces on the world scene and within the nation, and the state's foreign policy course which is interrelated with its military doctrine. Certainly, one cannot help but consider the military might of the probable and real enemy as well as the political system and social structure of one or another nation.

Military might is dynamic. It changes in a broad range, from its potential opportunities to their real utilization. And a certain reciprocal compensation of its components is admissible in the various stages of preparing for and conducting a war. For example, a lack of weapons to a certain degree can be compensated for by the high morale of the people and army.

Finally, military might is multidimensional and this is determined by its various states under peacetime and wartime conditions. We would point out that a state's real military might can be assessed not only post facto, when victory or defeat has pronounced a final verdict for its military efforts. This can and must be done also at any moment. All the more as military might is measured with sufficient accuracy using a system of corresponding potentials expressing the maximum capabilities of a state to mobilize its material and spiritual resources in anticipation or in the course of a war.

The most complete and precise criterion of real military might in a state during peacetime is its military readiness, that is, the readiness of the population and troops to fight one or another enemy for the sake of achieving certain political goals. The combat readiness of the armed forces comprises the basis of this readiness

The Soviet Armed Forces as a whole, each formation, each troop unit, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev has pointed out, should be in a state of readiness which would exclude the slightest opportunity for the aggressor to take us by surprise. The combat readiness of the troops, in a concentrated way, reflects the enormous efforts and material expenditures of the people on equipping the army; it reflects the awareness, combat skills and discipline of all servicemen, the art of the command in troop control and much else. Ultimately, this is the crown of troop military skill in peacetime and the key to victory in war (see "Leninskij kurso" volume 2, page 49).

The real military might of the Soviet state is a most important condition in the defense of socialist victories and universal peace. The socialist nations have achieved a military-strategic equilibrium with the capitalist world. This equilibrium restrains the desires of the aggressive forces. But if the imperialists unleash a war against the USSR and its allies, we will employ all our resources for a crushing rebuff to the aggressor.

In this instance, all the potentials (capabilities) of a nation realizable in the interests of strengthening defense might become factors, that is, driving forces and necessary material and spiritual conditions for repelling the aggressor. For this reason, in wartime the defense might of a state is assessed precisely by the factors of conducting war, by their quantitative and qualitative characteristics.

\* \* \*

Thus, the military or defensive might of the socialist state is a portion of state might which is used for maintaining the defense capability of the nation on the required level. The methodology for isolating its structural elements has been thoroughly elaborated in the works of the founders of Marxism-Leninism and in the CPSU documents.

In considering the defensive focus of Soviet military doctrine, it is the custom to define the military might of a socialist state through the components of defensive potential. The latter, in turn, represents a system of more particular potentials. Defensive potential is not a static amount but rather a variable one capable of both declining and increasing.

The natural desire of researchers to fully consider the potentials has led to a situation where in our literature the number of them is very great. Usually, such potentials of military might are named as: material, spiritual, economic, production, technical, scientific, scientific-technical, social, political, moral, managerial, personnel, demographic, natural, military per se, combat and so forth. However, it is not difficult to note that some of these potentials (for example, material, spiritual) include other, relatively independent potentials. For this reason their listing in the same series with the more particular components of military might is contradictory to the demands of logic.

A logically noncontradictory classification of a system of potentials can only be constructed by using different bases which are in a certain subordination.

The dividing of social life into material and spiritual is the most common, universal basis for classifying the system of potentials forming military might. In accord with this a state's military might in a most general form can be represented as the aggregate of material and spiritual potentials. The methodological possibility of such an approach to isolating the elements of military might is also pointed to by the thesis of the 26th CPSU Congress on the possibility of increasing the material and spiritual potentials of each republic in the interests of the harmonious development of our entire multinational motherland. Certainly such a universal approach can be made more detailed.

In his article "The Main Task of Our Times," V. I. Lenin, in reflecting on the ways "to create military might and socialist might" (PSS, volume 36, page 80), started the analysis from the natural riches of a nation and its reserve of human forces. Considering this the natural and demographic potentials hold an important place in the system of the socialist state's military might.

Obviously the so-called natural potential includes the geographic position of the nation, the size of its territory, mineral wealth, topography and climate. As is known, K. Marx and F. Engels repeatedly pointed to the significant impact of natural factors on the conduct of their contemporary wars. V. I. Lenin mentioned the gigantic dimensions of the nation as among the essential factors making it possible for the young Soviet state to sustain a comparatively long war against the White Guards and foreign interventionists.

The might of our state depends substantially upon the demographic potential, that is, upon what portion of the working-age population can be involved in defending the motherland and how it is trained in military terms. In this regard V. I. Lenin emphasized that modern warfare "requires high-quality human potential..." (PSS, volume 9, page 155). The social and particularly the demographic policy of the CPSU, in being elaborated at the recent party congresses, has helped to increase the "reserve of human forces" in our nation.

The basic spheres of social life operate as the essential foundation for isolating the potentials of military might. Four such spheres have come to be established: economic, social, political and spiritual. Precisely they, these spheres, determine the level of a society's maturity and, naturally, the degree of a nation's defense capability. That is, in using the words of F. Engels, in wartime an advantage is gained by the nation with a higher level of civilization.

In accord with these spheres of social life, the economic, social, political and spiritual potentials of a society can be established and a certain portion of these is employed in the interests of strengthening a state's defense capability.

The founders of Marxism-Leninism pointed to the dependence of a state's military might upon economic conditions. The maximum capabilities of an economy which can be employed for strengthening a nation's defenses and repelling aggression expresses the military-economic potential. The share of military consumption in national income usually serves as the criterion for assessing this. In anticipation of a war and in the course of it, the military-economic potential, as a rule, grows more rapidly than the economic potential as a whole. For example, in 1944, USSR gross industrial product, in relation to the 1940 level, equalled 104 percent, that is, it exceeded it

by 4 percent, while the product of the people's commissariats for the aviation, tank, weapons and ammunition industries had risen up to 251 percent.

At present the USSR possesses significantly greater economic and scientific-technical potentials than in the period of the Great Patriotic War for maintaining its defense might on the proper level and for quickly creating any type of weaponry which the enemies of peace would like to wager.

The realization of the basic directions and tasks for the nation's economic development as outlined by the 26th CPSU Congress and by the decisions of the November (1981) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee will further contribute to increasing the economic and defense might of our state.

But the economic factor is not all that is needed for protecting the fatherland and repelling imperialist aggression. The crucial role is played by a close interaction of military-economic potential with other potentials, primarily social. We have in mind the possibilities residing in the nature of the Soviet people as a unified social and international community and in the socialist way of life. These can be employed and are employed for defense purposes.

"History knows no state which in the shortest time has done so much for the all-round development of the nations and nationalities as the USSR, the socialist fatherland of all our peoples," states the Decree of the CPSU Central Committee "On the 60th Anniversary of the Formation of the USSR." "Their unity has been forged and strengthened in the course of industrialization, the collectivization of agriculture and the cultural revolution, in the struggle to build socialism. During the hard years of the Great Patriotic War, the fraternal peoples shoulder to shoulder rose to the defense of the motherland, they showed mass heroism and unflinching will to victory, they defeated the fascist invaders and rescued the peoples of the world from enslavement and destruction."

The social potential of our motherland is significantly higher than the corresponding potential of any capitalist state. Even before Great October, V. I. Lenin wrote that a more progressive system would be capable of ensuring a stronger military might. Our developed socialist society is strong in its solidarity. In it there are and cannot be any class and national antagonisms inherent to any bourgeois society. This is the essence of the powerful social potential of the USSR.

A socialist state of all the people possesses a high political potential. These are the possibilities and advantages of the Soviet political system making it possible to mobilize the material and spiritual resources of society to strengthen defense might. "We," said V. I. Lenin, "have openly proclaimed the rule of the workers and exploited people as this comprises our strength and the source of our invincibility" (PSS, volume 37, p 76). The CPSU is the core of our society's political system. It sees its duty in ensuring the economic, sociopolitical and spiritual development of the people and defending their victories.

Moral potential also is an important component in defense might. Being a component element of a society's spiritual potential, it expresses not only the politically but also the morally felt attitude of the Soviet people toward the defense of their victories and their readiness and ability to endure all hardships of war, if it is

forced on us. The Great Patriotic War demonstrated to the entire world the invincibility of the morale of the frontline soldiers and rear workers, the creators of the great victory over the fascist aggressor. In a developed socialist society, the moral potential of defense has become even weightier and stronger.

The scientific and managerial potentials also hold a special place in the structure of defense might. There is the well known Leninist notion that "without science it is impossible to organize a modern army...." (PSS, volume 40, p 183). In concretizing this idea, M.V. Frunze said before a military audience: "The representatives of science in the future will possibly play a more important role than all of us taken together. The discoveries in the area of chemistry and mechanics must be viewed as crucial turning points in the overall course of military operations... Our attention should be focused on establishing the closest ties with scientific people so that these ties are a preparatory force during the period of our peacetime activities and at the moment of a new war all the practical conclusions be used fully by us" ("Izbrannyye proizvedeniya" [Selected Works], Voyenizdat, 1977, pp 61-62).

At present, our nation possesses strong scientific potential. As was pointed out by the President of the USSR Academy of Sciences A. P. Aleksandrov, Soviet science provides approximately one-third of the entire world's scientific product. At present, science functions both as a direct productive force, as a special area of spiritual production and as a means for resolving a broad spectrum of social and political tasks. Naturally its achievements are also employed in the interests in strengthening Soviet defense might.

Managerial potential is characterized by the same universality. Any collective activity is impossible without management. Even at the beginning of 1918, V. I. Lenin set the task for the party of learning how to manage the nation. At present, the solution to the problems confronting us and the use of the possibilities which we possess, as was said at the 26th Party Congress, largely depend upon the level of national economic management, upon the level of planning and control.

The Soviet state possesses skilled personnel capable of successful management on all levels and in all spheres of social activity, including in the military affairs sphere.

It is also correct to put the military potential per se as distinct within the system of potentials for a state's defense might. Being a derivative of the economic, scientific, social, political and moral potentials, along with them it expresses the ability of the state to maintain and improve the armed forces, to increase their combat might, to recruit trained personnel and supply modern combat equipment and all types of supplies in peacetime and particularly in a period of war. The combat potential of the Armed Forces comprises the basis of Soviet military potential. This is a fusion of the high technical equipping of the army and navy, military skill and the unshakeable morale of their personnel.

\* \* \*

The defense of the socialist fatherland, the USSR Constitution states, is among the most important functions of the state and is a concern of the entire people. The necessity of further strengthening the nation's defense potential and particularly the combat potential of the Armed Forces is necessitated by the increased aggressiveness of imperialism.

The USSR and its Warsaw Pact allies are not endeavoring to attain military superiority over the NATO countries. "The existing military-strategic equilibrium between the USSR and United States, between the Warsaw Pact and NATO," emphasized Comrade L. I. Brezhnev at the 26th CPSU Congress, "objectively serves to preserve peace on our planet. We have not achieved and are not achieving military superiority over the other side. This is not our policy. But we will not permit such a superiority to be created over us. Such attempts as well as dealing with us from a position of strength are absolutely hopeless!" ("Materialy XXVI s'ezda KPSS" [Materials of the 26th CPSU Congress], p 22).

Our party proceeds from the view that, regardless of the complexity of the international situation, there is no fatal inevitability of a world thermonuclear war. The forces which are decisively struggling for the right of peoples to life are very powerful. The more they act for peace in an organized and united manner the less the chance remains for the proponents of settling international problems by war to achieve their goals.

An important factor for peace is the military might of the socialist commonwealth nations and primarily the might of the USSR which serves as the main impediment for realizing the plans of the aggressors. Soviet military might, said the member of Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee and USSR minister of defense, Marshal D. F. Ustinov, frightens them because they see in it an insurmountable obstacle on the path to achieving their aggressive plans. It is an effective impediment for them. But for peace in the world our might is a great good.

In struggling to prevent war, the party teaches the Soviet people to maintain high political vigilance. The experience of history indicates that the exploiting classes under the conditions of the advancing general crisis in capitalism have repeatedly endeavored to test themselves, in the words of V. I. Lenin, "in a last desperate battle" (PSS, volume 37, p 263) using all means to recover the "right" to dispose of the destinies of peoples. The hegemonic claims and militaristic policy of the current US administration reflect the interests of the most reactionary circles of imperialism and primarily the military-industrial complex for whom the production of the weapons of death has become the point of life and the source of fabulous profits. The American military machine is hopeful that a "first strike" nuclear attack against the vital centers of the USSR would make it possible for the United States to seize strategic initiative from the very outset of the war and thereby determine its outcome in its favor.

The destiny of peoples is of least concern to the supporters of the policy of folly. They plan on surviving protected by underground bunkers and to wait out nuclear death so as to then impose their conditions on the remaining portion of the population. But these cannibalistic plans are based on sand. Comrade L. I. Brezhnev authoritatively and categorically stated: "Whatever might an attacker might

possess, whatever method of starting a nuclear war was chosen, he would not achieve his goals. Retaliation would follow irrevocably."

The strengthening of our nation's defense potential is a necessary condition for restraining the aggressive forces against absurd military-political adventures. All the Soviet people are concerned with maintaining the economic, social, political, moral and specifically military potentials comprising the defense might of our motherland on the proper level.

The Soviet military are aware of their responsibility for the security of the motherland and for the defense of socialism's victories. They are making a worthy contribution to strengthening the military potential of the Soviet Armed Forces the role of which is particularly great in the system of the nation's defense might.

The union of socialist industry and science ensures the development of types of weapons and military equipment which will not be inferior in their tactical and technical indicators to the weaponry of the imperialist armies and navies. However, no matter how powerful the equipment might be, it is merely a means in the hands of man. The operation of the equipment, its maintenance, its safekeeping and, if necessary, its combat employment - all of this depends upon the professional skills of the soldiers.

But professionalism alone is not sufficient to defend the motherland courageously and wholeheartedly or to strengthen the combat potential of the army and navy. Here, high morale of the soldiers is very important. As is known, its core is comprised of a scientific ideology shaped on the basis of the ideology of Marxism-Leninism. For dependable defense of the victories of socialism it is also essential to have the appropriate moral-psychological readiness, that is, the ability of the soldiers under combat conditions to act boldly and decisively, sparing neither their blood or life itself for the defeat of the aggressor.

Particularly high responsibility rests on command personnel who should skillfully control their subordinates and achieve the highest results in training and combat with the least expenditure of resources. To a crucial degree the state of discipline in the units and sub-units, the scope and effectiveness of the socialist competition, the state of the moral-psychological climate in the military collectives and the level of their combat readiness depend upon the art of control.

The political bodies and party organizations are the unifying force of the military collectives. These mobilize the personnel of the Army and Navy to carry out their constitutional duty, the demands of the party and government, the military regulations, as well as the orders of the minister of defense and their direct and immediate superiors. The increased activeness and militancy of the party organizations is one of the major ways for strengthening the might and combat readiness of the Armed Forces.

At the November (1981) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev emphasized the need to work better and more efficiently, for this was ultimately the basic and crucial thing. The given party demand also applies fully to the Soviet military. The main essence of military service consists in protecting the life of

the Soviet people, providing them with an opportunity to utilize the fruits of their creativity and defend the victories of socialism. Precisely this most important function of military service gives it not only a noble, elevated sociopolitical purpose but also the highest moral value making it possible for each service man to realize himself as an individual whose interests are fused with the interests of society.

In this regard, one recalls the central episode from the book by Hero of the Soviet Union N. Kalutskiy "Ogon'--na sebya!" [Incoming Fire] which was recently published by Voyenizdat. When it was necessary whatever the cost to defend a small bridgehead on the western bank of the Vistula against the besieging Nazis, the battery commander Capt Kalutskiy who was on the bridgehead at a critical moment of combat decided to call in the fire of his guns on his own positions.... During the years of the last war there were many such heroes. The present generation of Soviet military is worthily continuing the traditions of the frontline veterans, the traditions of unstinting service for their socialist fatherland.

A heroic moral basis ennobles the labor of the men in a socialist army and gives them the right to represent the new man of modern times. We cannot perceive the pseudoprofound arguments of the French renegade R. Garaudy as anything other than a slandering of socialism. In his book "Za dialog tsivilizatsiy" [For a Dialogue of Civilizations], he has written that for 2,000 years Confucius and later Christianity "preached the necessity 'of changing man for the reorganization of society.' They were defeated. The Soviet leaders, on the contrary, considered a change in the social and economic order as sufficient for the birth of a new man. They also were defeated..." As we see, the renegade consciously disregards the fact that in our nation great importance is given not only to the social and economic remaking of society but also to the indoctrination and self-indoctrination of the new man.

This new man is a completely visible, real phenomenon just as the developed socialism which has been built in our nation is real and visible. The socialist army also shapes such new people. "The Soviet military," pointed out the USSR Minister of Defense, Mar SU D. F. Ustinov, "embody the best qualities of the people, their mind and talent, patriotism and awareness, industriousness and self-sacrifice. They are totally loyal to the cause of October, they are capable of securely defending their motherland and are ready to carry out a feat for the sake of its liberty and independence. One can always count on such people!"

The Soviet military are proud of such an assessment of their qualities. Along with all the people, they are fully determined to properly celebrate the significant jubilee of the 60th anniversary of the formation of the USSR. They will mark this by successes in military and political training, by mastering the modern weapons and military equipment, by improving their field, air and sea skills, by strengthening organization and discipline and by increasing the combat readiness of the ships and units. The socialist competition under the motto "A Secure Defense for the Peaceful Labor of the Soviet People!" effectively serves the achieving of high indicators in training and service.

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### COMMAND TRAINING IN THE CARPATHIAN MILITARY DISTRICT

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 7, Apr 82 (signed to press 19 Mar 82) pp 37-44

[Article published under the heading "Toward the All-Army Conference of Primary Party Organization Secretaries" by Lt Gen V. Silakov, member of the military council and chief of the Political Directorate in the Red Banner Carpathian Military District: "To Strengthen One-Man Command on a Party Basis"]

[Text] In reading "Vospominaniya" [Memoirs] by Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, each of us, military people, undoubtedly with particularly interest and, I would say, with a feeling of satisfaction responded to the lines devoted to the battalion commander Koptsov. Almost a half century later, Brezhnev with great warmth and respect recalled his former commander, in emphasizing such qualities of his as exactingness, sincerity, closeness to the men, a creative approach to the job, the ability to look to tomorrow and, most importantly, in peacetime to prepare fighters for carrying out the difficult missions which would arise in the war. "He was," writes Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, "the first regular officer whom I knew. Of such persons it is usually said that they are a military rock. By nature he was a person of few words, strong-willed and always smart and cheerful. For me he was both a mentor and the example of a true commander who had dedicated his life to the indoctrination of Soviet soldiers who at any moment could come to the defense of our great motherland."

In the words of the prominent political worker from the times of the Great Patriotic War as well as the outstanding party and state figure of modern times, the Chairman of the USSR Defense Council and Marshal of the Soviet Union, this assessment assumes truly symbolic significance and provides much reason for reflection. A battalion commander in the prewar years, a hero of the engagements on the Khalkhin-Gol river and a general killed on the front during the period of the Great Patriotic War, Vasiliy Alekseyevich Koptsov was a worthy example of the solely-responsible commander and a representative of the glorious cohort of valorous Soviet officer and generals who were raised and indoctrinated by the Communist Party and with honor justified the confidence and hope of the people.

The solely-responsible commander.... in our conscience these words and concepts have been fused together. For one-man command is a most important organizational principle in the development of the Soviet Armed Forces and it has been reinforced in the CPSU program. It provides the military leader with an opportunity to show

creative initiative and independence in taking decisions and troop control and to channel the collective efforts of subordinates toward a common goal of victory in combat and permanent high combat readiness in peacetime.

V. I. Lenin who provided a profound theoretical basis for this principle, viewed one-man command as an objective pattern in the organizational development of the new type army and a method of troop leadership which was most effective from the practical viewpoint. In military affairs, the creator of our party and state taught, more than anywhere else, it is essential to have the strictest unity of the actions of large masses of people, the subordinating of the will of thousands to the will of one man and the concentrating of troop control in single hands, in the hands of the commander.

In being guided by Lenin's instructions, the party has consistently followed the course of strengthening one-man command. The entire heroic history of the Soviet Armed Forces has convincingly shown the soundness and advisability of strictly observing the principle of one-man command in the army both in wartime and in peace-time.

The sociopolitical essence of one-man command in our Armed Forces consists in the fact that it is carried out in the interests of the people and the Soviet state, for strengthening the combat might of the Army and Navy which are called upon to securely defend the creative labor of the builders of communism. The Soviet solely-responsible commander is the loyal son of his people, the representative of the party and state, their trusted authority and the proponent of their policy in the Armed Forces. Our commanders and the rank-and-file are united into a monolith by class unity, by the commonness of the Marxist-Leninist ideology and the high goal of creating the most just society and its defense. Relationships between superiors and subordinates in our army are based on mutual trust, total dedication to the motherland and Communist Party and on the common desire to worthily carry out the sacred duty. All the life and activities of the Soviet military are permeated by an atmosphere of true socialist collectivism and comradeship, by moral-political solidarity and by the friendship of the soldiers who are the sons of all the nations of the USSR. One-man command in no way contradicts the democracy of a developed socialist society and its military organization.

A most important particular feature of Soviet one-man command is the fact that it is carried out on an inevitable party basis, in strict accord with CPSU ideology and policy and in a spirit of the demands of the USSR Constitution and the Soviet laws. "One-man command in the Soviet Army," Comrade L. I. Brezhnev pointed out, "is carried out on a party basis. This means that the commander in his work should constantly rely on the party and Komsomol organizations, make full use of their mobilizing force and authority, their creative activeness for increasing the combat readiness of the units and ship."

To strengthen one-man command on a party basis means to create conditions for successfully carrying out the decisions of the 26th CPSU Congress and for the effective fulfillment of the tasks set by the USSR minister of defense for further increasing vigilance and combat readiness and strengthening military discipline. A rise in vigilance and combat readiness is extremely essential under the conditions of the sharp aggravation of the international situation and the increased military danger from imperialism.

The Communist Party has placed high demands on the leadership personnel, including the military. All levels of leaders must show responsibility, organization and clarity in their actions, irreproachable discipline, professionalism, loyalty to party principles and creative initiative and master the Leninist style of work. Precisely this is demanded of them by the decisions of the 26th CPSU Congress and the November (1981) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee. Rights, and great rights, the Accountability Report of the Central Committee to the 26th CPSU Congress points out, are given to the leaders so that they can fully utilize them. But here each leader should constantly remember his great responsibility, the responsibility to the persons who have trusted him with leading, to the party and to the people.

The commander is the central figure in the army. He bears personal responsibility to the Communist Party and Soviet government for the combat and mobilizational readiness of the unit entrusted to him. The personal authority of the commander, his independence, professionalism, initiative, firmness, iron will and decisiveness make it possible to most efficiently organize the training and indoctrination of the personnel, to implant proper order and maintain strong military discipline as well as to flexibly and efficiently lead the troops under any conditions. At the same time the Soviet officer is not only a military specialist, not only an administrator granted great rights and power. At the same time he is the organizer and indoctrinator of the men who in his activities combines military and political leadership.

"The Soviet officer," commented the member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Minister of Defense, Mar SU D. F. Ustinov, "is primarily a person who clearly sees the political goals of the party and nation, who has a broad viewpoint and firm practical skills, who has completely mastered his profession and inseparably links his labor and daily life with the great affairs of the party and people. The Soviet officer is the able organizer of the masses of troops, a person of high principles capable of practically employing all that is new and advanced arising in military affairs in an enterprising and creative manner. As a demanding and considerate commander and superior, he knows how to and enjoys working with the men, he values collective experience, listens to the opinion of comrades and critically assesses what has been achieved." The military council and the political directorate of the Carpathian Military District, in carrying out the responsible and diverse tasks of improving troop combat training, constantly keep their eye on a broad range of questions related to strengthening one-man command on a party basis and increasing the officer's authority. We have repeatedly analyzed the work of the political bodies and party organizations in the area of indoctrinating affection for the commanders, a readiness to unswervingly and precisely carry out their orders and instructions as well as at profoundly explaining the essence and significance of Soviet one-man command. Here we have reminded the political workers and party aktiv that concern for the strengthening of one-man command cannot be reduced to the mechanical repetition of slogans and appeals. It should be manifested in concrete, planned organizational and indoctrinational work helping to develop in the personnel a respect and trust for the commander as well as in support of his indisputable authority.

For these purposes the district troops employ political exercises, lectures and reports on the Leninist principles of leading the Soviet Armed Forces, the essence and significance of one-man command as well as the commander's role in combat and in increasing the combat readiness of the troop collectives in peacetime. The units and subunits hold special-subject evenings and mornings on "Our Commanders" and "The Honor

and Valor of the Officers Are a Science and Example for Us" as well as the viewing and discussion of films showing the high moral-political qualities of the officers. In this work an important role has been played by a collective discussion of the works by Comrade L. I. Brezhnev "Malaya zemlya" and "Vospominaniya." Also very beneficial have been the meetings of the personnel with veteran officers and tales by veterans from the same units about their commanders and how the soldiers protected them in combat.

The political bodies and primary party organizations in every possible way support the strong-willed and demanding commanders who firmly implant proper order and skillfully organize the training and indoctrinal process.

Particularly indicative in this regard are the activities of the unit party committee which until recently was headed by the delegate to the 26th CPSU Congress Lt Col M. Danchuk. Here the activists realized well that the commander's authority is important not in and of itself but that it is vitally necessary for ensuring the effectiveness of the training and indoctrinal process and for uniting the efforts of the officers, warrant officers ["praporshchik"], the sergeants, the party and Komsomol organizations in the struggle for high combat skill of the personnel and firm military order. In using various forms of agitation and propaganda work, they disclose the role of the commanders as the creators and organizers of combat and using specific instances from the life of the collective they convince the officers that precisely in those battalions, companies and platoons where the commander's authority is higher, as a rule, discipline is stronger, the moral climate is better and there are more significant successes in training and the competition and in increasing the combat readiness of the subunits. The party meetings constantly focus the attention of the communists on the fact that their best support for the exactingness of a commander is the personal example set in service and discipline and the exemplary execution of his orders and instructions. The party members proceed in this manner. Quite naturally, this unit for 10 years running has had the title of excellent.

However, we proceed from the view that the strengthening of one-man command is a two-sided process, that is, the activities of the political bodies and party organizations should be constantly linked to the effective efforts of the commander himself. There is no need to prove that no "outsider" can create a good reputation for an officer who has not earned it or who has not won high authority by his undoubted competence, party and command qualities or personal example in service.

This is why the military council and the political directorate in the district in all the work related to the strengthening of one-man command have moved to the forefront the indoctrination in the commanders of high political, military, moral and volitional qualities and the increased sense of responsibility for carrying out official and party duties. In the system of Marxist-Leninist and commander training, we work primarily to strengthen the ideological and theoretical tempering of the cadres, to broaden their military theoretical viewpoint, to master the scientific methods of troop control, training and indoctrination, and to develop the organizational abilities and capacity to self-critically judge their work and the results of the activities of the military collective. In employing military theoretical and scientific practical conferences, seminars, lecture propaganda, the exchange of experience and other forms of work, the political bodies and party organizations help the officers profoundly study the decisions of the 26th CPSU Congress, the urgent questions of party theory and policy as well as to master the Marxist-Leninist methodology.

In the district special attention is paid to the recruitment and indoctrination of the regimental and unit commanders. The commander of such a large military collective as a regiment or separate unit is an extremely responsible position. It is that line which tests and develops the officer's ability to think widely, to independently take various decisions and bring them to a logical conclusion. This post particularly requires not only high personal training, initiative and creativity in work, the ability to select the main area of collective efforts and to critically assess what has been achieved, but also a profound party loyalty on the part of the leader.

Sessions of the district military council have repeatedly discussed the state of ideological-theoretical, professional and procedural training of the unit commanders and have strictly analyzed the style of their work aimed at carrying out the requirements of the party, the CPSU Central Committee and USSR minister of defense on the questions of further increasing vigilance and combat readiness, strengthening discipline and organization as well as improving the quality of political and combat training. The military council members, in meeting regularly with the regimental and unit commanders, directly on the spot teach them the most efficient methods of troop control, professionalism, principleness and a political approach to solving the urgent problems.

In this regard a good example is provided for the leadership by the district commander, Col Gen V. A. Belikov. He recently met with the regimental commanders. The question was about further improving the style of leadership for the units in light of the demands of the November (1981) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and the effective use of the experience of advanced officers in mastering the combat equipment and skillfully employing it in modern combat. The district commander gave the officers a number of specific recommendations on how to improve the combat readiness of the sub-units and units and more effectively organize the training and indoctrination of the men.

The purposeful work by the district military council, the political directorate and staff, by the commanders, political bodies and party organization of the units and formations has helped to increase the professional and political qualities of the command personnel and, consequently, to strengthen one-man command.

Comparatively recently Lt Col G. Andreyev was appointed to the position of commander of a motorized rifle regiment. A well-trained, experienced and demanding officer, he ably organized the training and indoctrination process, he provided effective control over the quality of the field skills, particularly the tactical and gunnery training of the personnel and in a short time had won high authority among his subordinates. This was largely aided by the fact that the regimental commander was the first to carry out the gunnery and driving exercises, he demonstrated a personal example of high combat skill and took an active part in party political work.

Largely due to the fact that the subordinates respected their commander and tried to equal him, a healthy moral-political atmosphere has developed in the collective. The regiment commanded by Lt Col G. Andreyev in the district was the initiator of a socialist competition to properly celebrate the 60th anniversary of the formation of the USSR and is confidently moving toward its goal of outstanding indicators in combat and political training

In our district there are many able, strong-willed and purposeful commanders. However, there are officers who do not fully meet the obligations placed on them and permit errors in work and thereby undermine their own authority. Constant control over the state of affairs on the spot has made it possible for the district command to promptly spot such phenomena and respond immediately to them.

Last year the military council at one of its sessions corrected, for example, Lt Col N. Puchkov who at that time had been unable to maintain the equipment in a state of high combat readiness. Strong demands were placed on the officer. At the same time he received useful professional advice on how to organize effective technical training, to carry out fleet maintenance days and service and protect the military equipment. The exacting talk at the military council produced good results. In a short period of time the previously existing shortcomings had been eliminated. In crucial tactical exercise, Lt Col N. Puchkov and his subordinates demonstrated high combat skill and an ability to effectively utilize the capabilities of the combat equipment. Puchkov himself received an order. All of this, certainly, helped to strengthen his authority.

To help a solely-responsible commander improve the style of his work, to eliminate shortcomings in the training and indoctrination of subordinates, in relations with the men and in his own nature not to allow conceit, to learn to self-critically analyze and assess the results of one's labor and to demonstrate principled party exactingness--all of this we consider to be our important duty.

Probably there has not been a single district meeting or conference for the command and political leadership which to one degree or another has not raised questions related to the strengthening of one-man command on a party basis. One must consider the dynamic processes presently occurring in the troops, including the increased complexity and scope of the tasks being carried out by the troops as well as the more rapid service growth of the officers than in previous years.

Here the party committees and bureaus can do a great deal. It is particularly important to correctly organize work with the young officers so that they literally from the very first days, from their first independent steps feel concrete help. It must not be forgotten that precisely this period is the crucial one in all the further career of the man. A certain style of activity begins to be formed, pedagogical skills are acquired and the commander's nature is shaped. This principle is not simple and naturally it requires the constant and skilled intervention by superior chiefs and party organizations. With a systematic, carefully thought out approach and with well-organized individual work, the party committee or bureau plays a significant role in the development of young commanders. And there is a need for such aid.

Far from all the company, battalion and regimental commanders who were recently appointed to these positions are fully aware of what it means to rely on the party organization, how its efforts must be directed to successfully fulfilling the combat and political training plans or strengthening military discipline, and how the mobilizing force, authority and creative activeness of the communists can be used to increase the fighting quality of the units and subunits.

For this reason we constantly explain to the commanders that their work jointly with the political bodies and party organizations should be organized on the basis of the

CPSU Bylaws, the Regulations Governing the Political Bodies of the Soviet Army and Navy, the Instructions to the CPSU Organizations in the Soviet Army and Navy as well as the combined arms regulations of the Armed Forces. In no instance does the commander replace the leading party body.

The political bodies and party organizations, in employing various forms of work, remind the commanders of the need to support in every possible way the activeness and creative initiative of the communists and Komsomol members and to promptly set for them specific tasks in the interests of increasing combat readiness and the quality of military and political training, to strengthen military order and the carrying out of the socialist obligations assumed by the personnel. They should see to it that they [the communists and Komsomol members] are personally involved in party political work. This has left its mark. As an example, certain regimental, battalion and company commanders infrequently spoke on political subjects to the men, for a long time they have not attended Komsomol meetings or sessions of the Komsomol committees and bureaus and did not delve into the activities of the people's control bodies. By party action these oversights were eliminated.

In the course of the recent reports and elections, 60 percent of the regimental commanders were elected as members of the party committees and bureaus. We consider this a very important factor as it helps to increase the commander's sense of personal responsibility for the work of the entire party organization and accustoms him to constantly consult with the party activists, to consider their opinion in settling various questions including personnel ones and to ably utilize the weapon of criticism and self-criticism. In a word, he learns to combine the individual authority granted him with the will of the party collective.

On this level we should note the ability of the CPSU member Maj Yu. Klynkin to rely on the party organization and direct its activities at solving the main problems of combat readiness. He always finds the time to talk with the secretary and other activists, he often himself proposes agendas for the next party meetings and makes professional, concrete proposals on how to increase the work of the party organization and raise its influence on all aspects of the life and combat training of the men. The commander always heeds the opinion and proposals of the communists and directs their creative initiative and political activeness at raising the field skills of the personnel.

In speaking about the strengthening of one-man command on a party basis, we would like to particularly emphasize the importance of coordinated work by the commander with his deputy for political affairs and the party organization secretary. Life has shown that success is achieved only in the instance that there is complete mutual understanding between them and they work using the method of a pooling of forces.

We feel that a good lesson for all leaders is the vivid example of correct relationships between an army commander, military council and political body as given in the book by Comrade L. I. Brezhnev "Malaya zemlya." These relations were based on high party loyalty and principleness and they had a professional, creative nature. The proposals of the chief of the political section, in being profoundly thought out and in considering the developing situation, always were supported by the commander and military council. The political workers, writes L. I. Brezhnev, "participated in the

preparation of offensive or defensive operations and the elaboration of operational plans did not occur without them. For example, I do not recall a single case where Gen Liselidze or the other army commanders with whom I fought did not consider my viewpoint or corrections which were at times quite substantial."

All of us, the leaders of any ranks, should learn close, collective mutually enriching work from which both the common cause assigned to us and the authority of each of us gain. Life has convincingly shown that only with coordination and clarity and with the pooling of efforts by the commanders, political workers and party organization secretaries can we successfully carry out the task posed by the CPSU Central Committee, that is, in fact to achieve a unity of ideological-theoretical political indoctrinal organizational and economic activities.

We see to it that the commander is profoundly aware of the possibilities of party political work, that he value it and be personally involved in its planning and practical execution. At one of the military council sessions, serious complaints were levelled against Lt Col V. Chigantsev. Along with his other failings, they pointed out the officer's poor personal involvement in political indoctrination and the lack of close contact and unity of views with the deputy commander for political affairs and the party organization secretary. Each of them worked separately. This had a negative impact on the affairs of the military collective. The commander was given specific advice and recommendations on how to rectify the situation. At present, effective control is being carried out over the elimination of shortcomings.

In the regard I would like to emphasize one other circumstance. A communist commander, in directing the activities of the party organization, at the same time remains a party member like everyone else (if one does not consider that higher demands are placed on him). He cannot stand above the party collective and its elected body or stand aside from the "rough" practical work in his own organization or from carrying out party assignments and decisions which are equally compulsory for all communists.

Many political bodies in our district constantly conduct diverse work related to the strengthening of one-man command. For example, I might mention the political section of the formation where officer N. Krasnyy works. Here on a planned basis they help the commanders master practical party political work, they analyze their activities and disseminate knowledge in the area of military pedagogics, psychology and ethics.

A majority of the commanders is actively involved in theoretical seminars and conferences and they frequently give reports, lectures and political information sessions to the personnel. Individual plans for independent work for the training period and talks with the officers on questions of their practical activities have become a daily habit. The political section analyzes how the unit and subunit commanders have mastered a Leninist work style and have learned to determine the chief element and to comprehensively conduct measures to improve combat readiness, to increase political indoctrination activities and strengthen discipline.

All of this has contributed to the party indoctrination of the solely responsible commanders, to increasing their political tempering and to acquiring experience in the leadership of subordinates. In the formation a majority of the commanders are worthy of praise. They are professionally well-trained, highly disciplined, efficient and authoritative officers. In 1981, three regimental commanders were promoted to higher positions.

Troop leadership does not come down merely to the taking of a decision and the issuing of an order. This is just the beginning. The main thing is to organize the subordinates and channel their efforts at effectively carrying out the training and service tasks. For this reason the successful work of a solely responsible commander largely depends upon his ties with the men, a knowledge of their mind and moods and the ability to influence them both by power, authority and persuasion. We constantly remind the officers of the party's demands on the leaders, that is, to always be in the thick of events and to see with one's own eyes the successes and shortcomings, the joys and concerns of the men.

The certification presently being carried out is an important incentive for the further growth of the officers, for developing their positive qualities and for eliminating shortcomings. In seeking objective certifications, the commanders, the political bodies, staffs, party organizations and personnel bodies profoundly study the men in their practical work, realistically assess their political, moral, volitional and professional qualities and direct the officers at the excellent execution of service duties.

We view the strengthening of one-man command on a party basis as a permanent task the carrying out of which to a significant degree determines the fulfillment of the demands of the 26th CPSU Congress and the USSR minister of defense on combat readiness, organization and discipline among the motherland's defenders. It also largely determines the quality and effectiveness of the training and indoctrinational process. Certainly in this important matter we have both unsolved problems and unused opportunities. In preparing for the All-Army Conference of Primary Party Organization Secretaries, the political bodies and party committees are seeking out ways to improve their activities in all areas, including in the indoctrination of both commanders and all the personnel, in a spirit of the exemplary execution of military duty. The greatest possible rise in the authority of the solely responsible commanders and the development of their ability to utilize the force of the party organizations are a dependable and secure way for strengthening the struggle of the district personnel to further strengthen combat readiness and to properly celebrate the 60th anniversary of the formation of the USSR.

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## ARMED FORCES

### PROBLEM OF DEVELOPING THE MILITARY COLLECTIVE DISCUSSED

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[Article by Candidate of Technical Sciences, Col S. S'yedin: "In the Interests of Uniting the Military Collective"]

[Text] The letter had arrived from the Transbaykal Military District. It was written by Sr Lt O. Zubkov whom I had met 6 months previously in discussing the sociopsychological problems of forming a military collective with the garrison's officers.

The skillful solving of these problems, as is known, is of great practical significance for strengthening the discipline of the personnel and increasing combat readiness. Success here is largely determined by the preparation of the commander for whom the principle of one-man command permits the use of all his influence and all the power granted him to maintain strict proper order. It goes without saying that the commander acts not alone but rather, in relying on the party and Komsomol aktiv, on the aid of the officers, warrant officers ["praporshchik"] and sergeants. This gives special significance to his ability to utilize the recommendations of military pedagogics and psychology in his practical activities. This was the question during the meeting with the unit's officers, a meeting at which the lecturer's comments developed into an open discussion of various aspects of indoctrinal work.

I recalled the words of the platoon commander, Sr Lt O. Zubkov, about the methods employed by him for studying his subordinates and the relationships existing between them. This work, as was apparent from examples, had become one of the crucial factors for ensuring high troop discipline and their steady training progress. The platoon which previously had been characterized by average indicators became one of the best in the unit and its commander was recommended for the position of company commander.

"...So I assumed my new subunit," wrote the senior lieutenant. "The range of my daily concerns had grown wider and the nature of the tasks carried out had changed. One of them, a particularly urgent one, was the unifying of the collective. The problem was that in the recently organized subunit, the training indicators were very low while discipline was lax amongst some of the men and this could not help but cause alarm. My own personal practical experience was insufficient to quickly rectify the situation. Please suggest what should be undertaken and by what means and methods a climate could be created in the company which would most favor the successful training and service of the men?"

In my reply to Oleg Yakovlevich Zubkov, I focused attention on mastering the patterns of the formation and development of a troop collective and the ability to employ them in practical work. "But first of all," I emphasized in the letter, "in the existing situation it is essential to clearly set the goals to which one would aim in the coming purposeful work. Let us discuss this question together." Since such reflection presently goes beyond the limits of personal correspondence, I am hopeful that other officer indoctrinators will become involved.

Hence, the military collective. Yet is it valid to speak about its formation? Possibly, any subunit (squad, crew, platoon, company, battery and so forth) from the very initial moment of its creation is already a collective?

I am confident that the answers to such questions could vary, as by a collective in the ordinary usage of the word one most often understands any group of persons with the mission of performing certain socially significant activity. However, on the sociopsychological level this definition requires substantial clarification.

Any socially significant activity, including military, has its own goals and is characterized by a certain content and focus. Consequently, only a correct and hence uniform understanding of the goals and tasks of military service by all the personnel forms a spiritual unity among the soldier and sailors and unites them around the common cause. For this reason when it is said that "the personnel is united," one also understands high combat skill, flawless teamwork among the men, their spiritual maturity, loyalty to troop comradeship and a healthy moral climate in the subunit.

As is known, military service is a collective matter while the development of weapons and military as means of collective maintenance and employment more and more predetermines the collective nature of military service. Young persons, in beginning to serve in the army, are sent to subunits within which they occupy one or another position and perform certain duties. The carrying out of combat training tasks, work on the equipment, the standing of daily detail, as well as mass cultural and athletic measures require close cooperation from fellow servicemen and develop in them common opinions, views, convictions, moods and so forth. In turn, the goals and tasks of concrete military activity in their own way are reflected in the awareness of each individual man. This introduces into the common sociopsychological phenomena of a specific sub-unit something unique and specific, without which it would be hard to speak about the spiritual unity of the personnel.

The derivatives of spiritual unity are such characteristics of a collective as its purposefulness, exactingness, combat teamwork and so forth. Such unity itself is the result of the sociopsychological development of the subunit where each man with his own views has arrived at a new quality, recognized a spiritual commonness with fellow servicemen and become the carrier of the formed collective psychology.

At the initial stage of forming a subunit, it is possible to isolate the period of familiarization with the men during which their views, inclinations, sympathies and so forth are ascertained. Here the drawing together of the young soldiers, as a rule, is of a disordered nature and the established contacts are not sufficiently strong.

But military activities require strictly determined and reliable relationships and these predetermine the corresponding level of sociopsychological maturity among the personnel.

Because of this a high level of sociopsychological development turns the subunit-group (a subunit which is in a certain initial stage of its development can conditionally be given this name) into a qualitatively new sociopsychological formation, into a new organism, into a subunit-collective in which the relationships are mediated by activities which are socially valuable and have become personally important for each serviceman. Such a military collective can still be called primary for all the personnel in it are in direct contact and this contributes to the development of uniform views, opinions and judgements.

Naturally, the auspiciousness of the sociopsychological phenomena can be the most diverse for the activities of the collective, that is, from negative to positive. The psychological climate in the subunit is also characterized by the corresponding parameters. In practical terms such a climate is often viewed as a feeling of satisfaction shared by all members of the collective. At the same time this feeling can develop both on a healthy and unhealthy moral base. Here as an example one might comment on an occasion described in the letter of Sr Lt O. Zubkov.

Prior to his assumption of the new position, a disciplinary infraction had been committed in the company. Before the evening inspection Capt A. Safronov had established that one of the soldiers had left the subunit without leave and had returned to the barracks only by the forming-up. Nevertheless the company duty officer and orderlies denied this to a man. That day and on following ones it was impossible to learn who precisely had violated discipline and because of this the alarm of certain men was replaced by complacency. As the letter's author rightly pointed out, behind this external "emotional auspiciousness," one cannot help but see the dangerous "disease" of protecting negative phenomena in the subunit's life.

In fact, the main thing in a psychological climate is what moral phenomena are reflected in it. Only in the instance when all the members of the collective are aware of the social significance of joint military activity and this awareness involved relationships based upon the standards of communist morality is it possible to speak about the healthy atmosphere of a subunit. But, I repeat, this stage does not arrive all at once. A certain time is required so that the new men and soldiers with different periods of service come to feel that they are a united organism, a military collective. The difficulty is that in a youth environment the solving of sociopsychological and psychological-pedagogical problems in organizing a collective and controlling its impact on the individual is complicated by specific factors.

Youths 18-20 years of age are actively shaping their ideology. They endeavor to understand and learn where human happiness lies, what is the meaning of life: they are elaborating their principles of life and their moral ideal. At times in their deeds one can see their still limited social experience and insufficient sociopolitical maturity. The 26th CPSU Congress pointed out that in some young people a high level of education and awareness is combined with political naivete and professional training coexists with an insufficiently responsible attitude toward labor. All of this determines the particular complexity of shaping both the young military collective as a whole as well as indoctrinating the required moral-combat qualities in its members.

Experience shows that even insignificant oversights in the indoctrination of a military collective are felt primarily in difficult training situation and on long hikes

and marches. Separateness and lack of unity in views and desires do not make it possible to achieve success while for a strong, forceful collective this does not represent any particular difficulty.

It must be said that the lessons extracted from such practical testings are very convincing and visible. However they come, as a rule, at too great a price. For this reason in the forming of a military collective, the trial and error method is least acceptable. Here there must be purposeful, constant well thought out work by all levels of commanders, by the political workers, the party and Komsomol aktiv as well as the ability to clearly analyze the situation in a subunit and to conduct the training and indoctrination of the personnel in a modern manner and on a scientific basis.

As was pointed out by the USSR Minister of Defense Mar SU D. F. Ustinov, the Armed Forces are now receiving young people who in terms of the level of their development, literacy and diversity of interests stand higher than their predecessors. The political and military indoctrination of such youth requires higher skills from the commanders and political workers. "Endeavor in this regard," I emphasized in my letter to Sr Lt O. Zubkov, "in the course of your daily concern as much as possible to carefully analyze your decisions and actions and check how they conform to the most important pedagogical principles. Life constantly requires a broadening of the range of procedures and methods for indoctrinating the personnel and for ensuring their greatest effectiveness, primarily in the sphere of ideological indoctrination. If such work is not sufficiently informative and purposeful, if as a consequence of this its influence on the course of combat training is weakened, then one can say with confidence that the high ideals and tasks of daily service will be overshadowed and somewhat eroded in the awareness of the men. Without a high guide and without a profoundly felt noble goal it is difficult to count on the strong solidarity of the personnel."

The letter also takes up the following problem. A profound awareness of the goals of military activity elevates each man as an individual and leads to his increased responsibility for the fate of the subunit or unit and the security of the motherland. "A man," wrote the well known Soviet pedagogue A. S. Makarenko, "who determines his conduct only by the immediate prospects is the weakest man. If he is satisfied solely with his own prospects, however distant these may be, he may appear strong but he does not evoke in us any sensation of beauty of character or real value. The broader the collective the prospects for which are personal prospects also for a man, the more beautiful and higher this person." Consequently, the preparation of a commander to provide for the training process consists not only, for example, in the planning and execution of the next exercise, in working for "better knowledge," "the reinforcing of skills," "the working out of procedures" and so forth, no matter how important this is independently, but also in ensuring the indoctrinal goal of each exercise.

To clearly establish and set the goals for the activities of one's subunit and to clearly see in them the personal and social interest of the subordinates are the most important task for a commander in uniting the personnel. In response to Sr. Lt. O. Zubkov, I drew attention to the most important aspects of such work:

- 1) A thorough explanation to all the men, and primarily the young recruits, the high purpose of a defender of the motherland;

- 2) The close linkage of daily military service and its goals with the political situation on the international scene and with the actions of the imperialist forces;
- 3) The posing for subordinates of sufficiently complex but at the same time realistic training and indoctrinal goals;
- 4) The creating of conditions which ensure high effectiveness of military service;
- 5) Disclosing the impact of joint activities upon the development of each man and the military collective as a whole.

Another important factor was also pointed out. In disclosing the goals of military activity and the development prospects of a military collective, one should not fear returning to the same problems. Life does not stand still, the tasks are ever more complex and the explaining of them on a new level is of great significance for the positive formation of a moral climate in a subunit. In noting this aspect in the activities of leaders, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, in his book "Tselina" [Virginlands] has written: "There are questions to which one must return again and again. What does this show? I feel, on the one hand, it shows the urgent importance of the given problem, and on the other, the enormous difficulty of solving it. The constant return to such problems is an extra proof of the seriousness of our intentions."

It is also essential to bear in mind, as was emphasized in the letter to O. Zubkov, that the forming of a unity of goals and prospects for the development of a subunit is inseparably linked to the establishing of healthy relationships in the military environment. Here special attention must be paid to the microgroups which form spontaneously in the course of joint activities and the interpersonal contacts of the men. If the direction in such groups coincides with the direction of the commanders, the political workers, the communists and the Komsomol aktiv, then relationships of true and not falsely understood friendship and comradeship are established in them. But in groups where there is a negative effect, various deviations from the requirements of the regulations are not to be excluded. The prevention of such phenomena can be effectively aided by two forms of organizing the relationships between the men:

- 1) A relationship of responsible dependence;
- 2) Broadening the spheres of contact between the servicemen.

The realizing of relations of responsible dependence comes down to creating conditions whereby the social roles of the servicemen who are equal in military rank and positions, in carrying out various combat training, sociopolitical, mass cultural and housekeeping tasks, change systematically. This leads to the periodic subordination of servicemen to one another and to the creation of an opportunity for each member of the military collective to make his demands on fellow servicemen. Here is one of the examples which was emphasized by Sr Lt O. Zubkov.

A regular exercise was underway in the signals company under the command of Capt A. Basisty. The young signal troops were learning to tune a radio. A unique feature in the organization of the exercise was that the specialists were divided into three-man groups and worked according to the following scheme: one of the men read the textbook out loud and at the same time performed certain operations on the equipment,

the second monitored his actions and the third watched the work of both men and helped them. If the first man of the training team made an error in choosing an operation or in carrying it out, the second trainee stopped him and corrected him. The third man of the team recorded the time required to carry out the norm as well as the shortcomings in the work of the comrades. Subsequently the men changed roles so that each man had been in all the training positions. With such an organization of the exercise, when the trainee who was directly performing the training exercise came under the control of comrades who were capable of also helping him, there was not only the successful mastery of the equipment by the men but also the development of certain collectivist qualities in them.

The realization of relationships of responsible dependence in the social life of a subunit presupposes the performing of various assignments by the different servicemen and the broad involvement of the largest possible number of the collective's members in the work. Here it is very important not to overlook those men who at times are somewhat isolated from all the personnel. To discover such soldiers and sailors and to involve them in the preparation and execution of the corresponding measures means to create relations of responsible dependence between them and fellow servicemen. All of this is of essential significance for levelling out relationships in the subunit and for forming the military collective as a whole.

The same goal is pursued by the work carried out by the commander, the communists and the Komsomol aktiv in a subunit to broaden the sphere of contact between the servicemen. Here the essence comes down to making certain that each man in the process of daily training interacts actively with various servicemen: with some in the course of exercises and drills at battle stations, with others in standing daily detail, with still others in the course of preparing for political exercises and so forth. This, in the aggregate with relations of responsible dependence, makes it possible for the men to better understand each other, to gain mutual interests, to develop uniform views and better feel the pulse of life in one's subunit. The interdependence of the men and the collective gives rise in each soldier to a feeling of self-interest in the success of the entire subunit. This in turn influences the development of such character traits as a readiness to subordinate personal interests to social ones and a desire for mutual help.

In the development of collectivist qualities in the personnel, an important role is played by the correct organization of the socialist competition in the subunit. In this regard it is completely essential to focus attention on ensuring a spirit of competitiveness and mutual aid and developing a feeling of "us" which is common to all the personnel. The greatest successes in this work are achieved where the men have a constant opportunity to compare the achievements and failures of their subunit with the indicators of other subunits and collectively to work out the ways and means for achieving higher results.

Competitiveness on the psychological level is the essence of any rivalry. In and of itself it can act as a prerequisite for competition. For this reason the young commander was advised that an inseparable part of the competition in his company should be a daily struggle to observe the honor of the Soviet soldier, the standards of communist morality and military ethics as well as for irreproachable conduct, exemplary appearance and smartness. The duty of the officer indoctrinator is to set an example of exactingness in assessing the achieved, to create an atmosphere of mutual

exactingness in the collective, to encourage and stimulate useful initiative in every possible way, and to laud the exemplary, most disciplined men. The organizational efforts precisely in this area contribute most to developing insubordinates a feeling of collectivism and a heightened sense of responsibility for the state of affairs in the subunit.

In conclusion, I would like to point out that the solving of problems related to the development of the military collective and to the further strengthening of proper relationships and discipline requires a close unity of ideological and organizational work on the part of the commanders, the political workers, the party and Komsomol organizations. Their joint efforts should be aimed at adding to the glorious traditions of the Army and Navy service in which is remarkable schooling for labor and military skills, for moral purity and courage, for patriotism and comradeship.

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## ARMED FORCES

### OUTLINE FOR INDOCTRINATION ON MILITARY DISCIPLINE

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 7, Apr 82 (signed to press 19 Mar 82) pp 77-84

[Article by Col G. Solov'yev: "High Military Discipline--A Major Condition for the Combat Capability and Constant Combat Readiness of the Troops"]

[Text] Six hours are assigned for studying the given question. It is recommended that the exercise be conducted by the method of a lecture and a lively, full-scale discussion. In the course of giving the material, the propagandists must help the students more profoundly understand the essence and significance of military discipline in the life and combat activities of the Army and Navy, the legacy of V. I. Lenin and the demands of the Communist Party and the Soviet government on the discipline and organization of the servicemen as well as the necessity of unchallenged obedience of commanders and superiors. It is important to focus the soldiers and sailors on the struggle for the greatest possible strengthening of discipline and proper order in their subunit, unit or ship and to impel them to always act as the oath and regulations and the duty of a defender of the motherland require.

In the exercise the following questions must be reviewed: 1. V. I. Lenin and the CPSU on the need for high organization and conscious discipline on the part of the Soviet people and the men of the Army and Navy. 2. Strong military discipline--a most important condition for constant combat readiness and for achieving victory in combat. 3. The responsibility of servicemen for carrying out the demands of military discipline.

Considering the importance of the studied subject, the leadership of the units, ships and formations and the most experienced propagandists should be involved in conducting the exercises.

In the introduction it is important to point out that throughout the nation active preparations have commenced for the 60th anniversary of the formation of the USSR. The Soviet people have every right to be proud of their accomplishments. Led by the party of Lenin, they have created a powerful economic and defense potential, modern science and culture. This opens up favorable opportunities for successfully carrying out the evermore complicated tasks of communist construction as outlined by the 26th CPSU Congress.

At the same time it must not be forgotten that the Soviet people must build a new society under a difficult international situation. The aggressive imperialist circles

have set the goal of erecting a barrier on the path of progressive changes in the world and recovering the role of the disposers of the destinies of peoples.

The United States is the instigator of this policy. Under the pressure of the current U.S. Administration headed by R. Reagan, the arms race has reached unprecedented size in the capitalist world. The United States has openly set out on a path of active material preparations for a new world war. This nation is unrestrainedly saturating its arsenals with nuclear missile, neutron and chemical weapons and is endeavoring to implicate its NATO partners in this militaristic course. The policy of the Maoist leaders of China is closely linked to the aggressive course of imperialism.

Under these conditions our party and state show true Leninist restraint, firmness and principledness and they consistently defend the cause of peace and international security. They consider that the aggressive intrigues of imperialism and the other enemies of peace require constant vigilance and the greatest possible strengthening of our state's defense capability. This is essential in order to thwart the plans of imperialism to achieve military superiority and dictate to the world and to prevent a nuclear catastrophe.

Our valorous Armed Forces have been and remain a dependable guard for the peaceful labor of the Soviet people and a bulwark of universal peace. Due to the party's constant concern, they are equipped with everything necessary to defend the motherland and the victories of socialism. "A strong alloy of high technical equipping, military skill and unshakeable morale," commented Comrade L. I. Brezhnev at the 26th CPSU Congress, "this is the combat potential of the Soviet Armed Forces" (Materialy XXVI s"yezda KPSS" [Materials of the 26th CPSU Congress], p 66).

In warmly approving the domestic and foreign policy of the CPSU and Soviet government, the men of our Army and Navy show the greatest vigilance, they constantly strengthen their organization and discipline and increase their combat readiness.

#### 1. V. I. Lenin and the CPSU on the Need for High Organization and Aware Discipline on the Part of the Soviet People and the Men of the Army and Navy.

V. I. Lenin considered socialist discipline to be a powerful weapon of the party and the people in the struggle to build a new society. "...Only the strictest organization and labor discipline," he pointed out, "will lead us to socialism" (PSS [Complete Collected Works], vol 36, p 258).

Lenin was a supporter of an irreconcilable struggle against the violators of production discipline and Soviet law and order. He put them on the same level as the enemies of socialism and demanded that strict punishments be levelled against them. In the draft of the Sovnarkom [Soviet of People's Commissars] decree written in March 1918, V. I. Lenin pointed out that it was essential to focus efforts on work in the setting up of courts which would be actually quick and actually revolutionarily merciless against the counterrevolutionaries, bribe takers, wreckers and violators of discipline.

The instructions of the leader of our party and state on the greatest possible strengthening of discipline, order and organization in Soviet society have not only not lost their validity but have assumed particular pertinence in our days. At the

present stage of communist construction, organization and discipline have become one of the crucial factors in increasing the economic and defense might of the socialist state of all the people.

The 26th CPSU Congress again drew attention to the need for further strengthening legality, order and discipline, improving the indoctrination of the workers in a spirit of the strict observance of Soviet laws, and high responsibility for state interests. In speaking at the Congress, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev emphasized that under present-day conditions the importance of discipline, the importance of personal responsibility have increased many-fold. The supreme forum of our nation's communists urged all the party and social organizations along with the state institutions to work for a responsible approach on the part of each citizen to his duties, to the interests of the people and to carrying out the state plans.

It must be pointed out that the congress instructions bear directly on the Soviet Armed Forces as well. Here it is essential to remember that the indoctrination of our servicemen in a spirit of conscious military discipline is a component part in the process of forming the new man. In preparing the Soviet youth to defend the motherland, the USSR Armed Forces at the same time make a major contribution to the general process of indoctrinating the younger generation. They inculcate in the young men a profound respect for the socialist laws and order and develop the habit of observing discipline in daily life. "The young men arrive in the military family without having schooling in life," said Comrade L. I. Brezhnev. "But they return from the army already as persons who have gone through the schooling of restraint and discipline and who have received technical, professional knowledge and political training" ("Leninskij kursom" [By the Leninist Course], vol 5, p 535).

In defining the scientific bases or the organizational development of the new type army, V. I. Lenin devoted great attention to the questions of military discipline. He taught that the army is a complex social organism and that all its victories and defeats depend directly upon organization, discipline, the unity of will and action. "...A war," said V. I. Lenin at the Seventh Party Congress, "has provided the Russian people with a bitter, torturous but serious lesson in organizing, becoming disciplined, learning to subordinate oneself and create a discipline which is exemplary" (PSS, vol 36, p 23).

In the ideas of V. I. Lenin, exemplary discipline is an indispensable condition for securely defending the victories of October against the aggressive encroachments of the imperialists. Without this it is impossible to withstand the pressure of the trained imperialist armies which are armed to the teeth.

During the years of the Civil War, in considering the exceptionally important role of iron military discipline in achieving victory over the enemy, the leader of our party and state demanded that all the laws concerning the Red Army and all orders be obeyed not out of fear but rather out of awareness and that discipline in the Red Army be maintained in every possible way. "The person who does not help the Red Army in every possible way and wholeheartedly, who does not support order and discipline in it with all his strength," he pointed out, "this person is a traitor and betrayer..." (PSS, vol 39, p 152).

V. I. Lenin taught that discipline in the Soviet Armed Forces should fundamentally differ from the discipline in bourgeois armies. Lenin repeatedly said that the old army, because of its social nature and purpose was an army of barracks drill and routine and the torturing of the soldiers. In such an army discipline is based on the principle of domination and subordination and rote obedience. This is instilled by violent means, by a system of deception and the ideological anesthetizing of the masses of soldiers.

For example, in the U.S. Army, the methods of so-called "rough training" are particularly in fashion. This is based on inhumaneness, cruelty and sadism by which the officers and sergeants endeavor to harden the soldier, to drive everything human out of him and turn him into a professional murderer.

As is recognized in the American press, the word "discipline" is closely linked in the awareness of American servicemen with the word "punishment." Here is a characteristic example. At Parris Island on the Atlantic coast of the United States there lies the U.S. Marine training center. Here the new recruits undergo an 8-week course in basic training. "The soldier who arrives here," stated the West German magazine DER STERN, "forgets that he has a name. Instead of this the number of his platoon is written in ink on the back of his hand.... From his open mouth comes only the cry: "Yes, sir." Anyone who dares say an extra word is subjected to 'special handling' until, broken and gasping, he collapses at the feet of the instructor."

Discipline in the Soviet Armed Forces is based on fundamentally different principles. The victory of Great October and the consolidating of Soviet power, a power expressing the fundamental interests of the working class and all toilers, made a transition to the establishing of conscious and voluntary discipline in our nation necessary and possible. V. I. Lenin and the Communist Party devoted particular significance to establishing such discipline in the Army and Navy. In contrast to the compulsory, violent discipline in the armies of exploiting states, it, in the definition of V. I. Lenin, is based on awareness, dedication and the self-sacrifice of the workers and peasants themselves.

The essence of Soviet military discipline is defined by the social and state system of our nation and by the nature of a socialist state's armed forces. It is decisively influenced by such factors as public ownership of the weapons and means of production, the moral and political unity and friendship of the Soviet peoples, Soviet patriotism and socialist internationalism.

Under the conditions of a socialist army, the men are united and brought together by an unshakeable ideological, political and social unity. In contrast to a bourgeois army, in such an army the soldiers and sailors, on the one hand, the officers, generals and admirals, on the other, do not stand in opposition to one another. All of them have emerged from the working people, from the workers, peasants and people's intelligentsia. They have one common goal of constantly strengthening the might and defense capability of the socialist fatherland and securely protecting the revolutionary victories of the people.

The unshakeable ideological, political and social unity of society serves as a strong source of activity and initiative on the part of the Soviet military and causes them not mechanically, not out of the fear of punishment, but completely consciously and

intelligently to carry out the orders of the commanders and superiors, their own service duties and the disciplinary requirements. For this reason high, aware discipline has become one of the most important principles in Soviet military organizational development and this our party has steadily and unswervingly carried out from the very first days of the existence of the Soviet Armed Forces.

By the entire course of argument the propagandist should lead the men to the conclusion that strong, conscious discipline, the strict observance of proper order and organization are an important condition in the combat capability and constant combat readiness of the Army and Navy. Precisely discipline unites the military collectives into a single whole, it makes the troops a well organized, flexible and easily controlled organism and gives them combat capability. In obeying the will of the solely responsible commander, both the individual men as well as the subunits, units and ships operate in coordination, they purposefully and successfully surmount the difficulties and achieve victory over the enemy.

## 2. Strong Military Discipline--A Most Important Condition in the Constant Combat Readiness and in Achieving Victory in Combat.

The discipline of the Soviet soldier mirrors his high political awareness, inner confidence and readiness to skillfully and wholeheartedly carry out his sacred duty to defend the motherland and the victories of socialism. The heroic chronicle of the Great Patriotic War contains many vivid combat examples showing the great importance of discipline for achieving victory over the enemy.

... This happened in the first days of May 1942. The heavy tank company was given the mission as part of the 33rd Tank Brigade to advance on Demyansk. The tank carrying the inscription "Suvorov" on its side moved forward firing against the enemy trenches. Suddenly the tank's body was shaken by a powerful blow as it had detonated a mine. Loyal to their military oath and endeavoring to carry out the commander's orders completely, five tankmen--V. Fedorov, N. Solonin, V. Borisov, A. Zhukov and N. Korablev--firmly resolved not to withdraw from battle and to cause maximum possible losses to the enemy. The tank was repaired by their own forces under enemy fire. The courageous soldiers were in the besieged tank 120 hours in repelling fierce fascist attacks. They destroyed an enemy pillbox and wiped out two guns and a large number of Nazis. When darkness fell, the damage was repaired. At the end of five days the tank had been fully repaired. The courageous crew drove the tank out from under the very nose of the enemy. Later on they counted 60 shellholes in it. But it was again back in service.

The given episode reaffirms that it is just one step from discipline to heroism. A disciplined soldier is profoundly aware of his duty to defend the motherland and is first concerned with how to best carry out the set mission and for the sake of this he considers neither the danger nor risk to life.

Strong military discipline is not only a most important condition for victory in combat but is also the basis for the constant combat readiness of the troops in peacetime. Without it daily service, life and training of the soldiers and sailors are inconceivable. Only in strictly carrying out the demands of discipline as embodied in the military oath, regulations, manuals, instructions and orders of the commanders is it possible to achieve constant readiness of the personnel to thwart the aggressive plans of our class enemies on the international scene.

The party's demands on military discipline are most fully reflected in the military oath, in the Disciplinary Regulations and the Internal Service Regulations of the USSR Armed Forces. The provisions formulated in these documents incorporate the enormous historical experience of Soviet military organizational development and the combat experience of the Great Patriotic War and reflect the present-day changes in military affairs.

Military discipline, as is stated in the Disciplinary Regulations, is the strict and precise observance by all servicemen of the procedures and rules set down by Soviet laws and military regulations. It is based on an awareness of each serviceman of military duty and personal responsibility to defend his motherland, the USSR.

Military discipline obliges each serviceman to strictly observe the USSR Constitution and Soviet laws and to precisely carry out the requirements of the military oath, the military regulations, the orders and instructions of commanders (superiors); to steadfastly endure all the hardships and deprivations of military service, to spare neither one's blood or life itself in carrying out military duty; to strictly keep military and state secrets; to be honest, just, to conscientiously study military affairs and in every possible way protect the allocated weapons, combat and other equipment, military and public property; to show respect to commanders (superiors) and chiefs, to observe the rules of military courtesy and saluting; to behave with dignity and honor while away from the unit, not to allow oneself and to restrain others from violating public order and in every possible way assist in defending the honor and dignity of citizens.

Under today's conditions, the importance of military discipline has immeasurably risen. This is explained by the complex and extremely intense nature of modern combat, by the employment of qualitatively new weapons, by the major changes in military affairs and by the acuteness of the international situation. At present as never before there must be the conscious and strict execution of the procedures and rules established for the Army and Navy. At present it is particularly important that each soldier and sailor flawlessly carry out the orders and regulations and the requirements of all documents regulating the operating rules for military equipment and weapons. Life confirms that the slightest deviation from them can lead to severe consequences and to reduced combat readiness of the subunit, unit or ship.

At present particular significance has been assumed by the ability of the soldier, sailor and the military collective as a whole to carry out rapid, precise and co-ordinated actions which run into minutes or seconds. The concept of discipline is inseparable from the exemplary, intelligent operation of the combat equipment and weapons, as well as the strictest observance of the regulations, instructions, technical rules and standards.

The standing of alert duty places exceptionally high demands on the discipline of the men. This involves great moral and physical stress and the necessity to focus all abilities and all capacity on carrying out the combat mission. Certainly modern combat and the repelling of a surprise attack by the aggressor are inconceivable without rapid decision taking and the ability of the soldier or sailor to flawlessly handle his duties in the shortest period of time.

Many types of modern weapons are designed for group, collective use. These are served by crews, teams and entire troop subunits. For example, for destroying a supersonic airborne target it is essential to have coordinated and quick actions of the crews of the radar stations, communications, the antiaircraft missile complexes and the crews of fighter interceptors. If even one military specialist makes the slightest delay or mistake, the combat task may not be carried out.

Clarity and speed in executing an order, the highest discipline and responsibility--these are the qualities which are needed more than ever before by a soldier in any of the Armed Services, branch of troops or any combat profession. The key to success lies in a profound understanding on the part of each soldier, sailor, each team, crew, squad and personnel of a subunit, unit or ship of the great importance of the tasks confronting them and the necessity of their precise and prompt fulfillment.

It is wise to remind the listeners that powerful weapons, advanced equipment and very complex instruments and mechanisms by themselves are not everything. They gain strength only in experienced and able hands, in their skillful and exemplary operation. For this reason the desire to master a military skill as quickly as possible, to acquire the experience of the training pacesetters and to become an outstanding man and a high-class specialist is one of the important indicators of a soldier's discipline and his profound understanding of his tasks. "Precisely men," commented the USSR Minister of Defense, Mar SU D. F. Ustinov, "who are ideologically tempered, totally loyal to the party and people, who have mastered the first-rate military equipment determine the success of any cause. In our subunits, units and ships there are very many soldiers and sailors who are aware, flawlessly disciplined and who in an exemplary manner carry out their military duty. They are a visible example for all the remaining soldiers and it would be wise if the propagandists mentioned the most outstanding of them at the exercise."

In speaking about the new, stricter criteria in the approach to military discipline, it is essential to point to the increased role of self-discipline. Self-discipline is the capacity of the soldier to control himself and his deeds, to show restraint and self possession, to be able to promptly spot his own error, inaccuracy or shortcoming and eliminate them without waiting for instructions from the commander or comments from comrades. To put it figuratively, self-discipline is human conscience in action.

Precisely self-discipline helps a soldier commit a bold, courageous feat and under exceptional circumstances, a feat for the sake of the motherland. A feat is the highest manifestation of self-discipline, ideological maturity and political awareness of a soldier. The book of Comrade L. I. Brezhnev "Malaya zemlya" describes this very profoundly and clearly: "Of course, a feeling of fear of death is inherent to people and this is natural. But the decision at a critical moment comes as if spontaneously and prepared for all my previous life. Hence, there is a certain limit, a certain instant when in a soldier-patriot an awareness of his duty to the motherland represses both the feeling of fear, the pain and the thought of death. Hence, a feat is not a gratis act but rather conviction in the rightness and greatness of the cause for which a person consciously gives up his life" ("Leninskij kursom," vol 7, p 42).

The main thing in military discipline is the profoundly felt obedience and efficiency, that is, the unswerving obedience of the soldier or sailor to his commander and the prompt and accurate fulfillment of his orders and instructions. "The order of a commander (superior)," state the Disciplinary Regulations, "is the law for subordinates. An order should be carried out unquestioningly, accurately and on time." This demand should become part of the flesh and blood of a soldier from the very first day of his service.

To carry out an order unquestioningly means to carry it out without any stipulations, arguments or hesitations. It is impossible to dispute an order or doubt the correctness of an issued instruction. It is essential to explain well that the commander, in showing great exactingness for his subordinates, proceeds from the interests of the motherland.

It is very important that each soldier consciously develop in himself the habit of obedience and efficiency. That he always and everywhere--when the commander is nearby and when he is not--strictly observes the procedures and rules established in the Army and Navy and acts as the military oath requires and the regulations command. It must be realized that efficiency does not encroach on the personal dignity of a soldier or sailor. It rather shows his profound understanding of the essence of military service, his consciousness and desire at any price, disregarding the dangers and risk to life, to carry out the order received from the commander and ultimately perform his military duty.

A commander's exactingness based on the provisions of the military regulations and manuals must not be perceived as captiousness. Certainly the commander is doubly or triply strict with himself. If the men are not accustomed to carry out the commander's will unquestioningly, then he cannot direct the efforts of the personnel to carrying out the tasks confronting the subunit and all the more successfully control subordinates in combat. With good reason the veterans had a saying: "It is possible to die but it is impossible not to carry out an order."

To dedicate all one's forces, knowledge and energy to the best carrying out of military duty--this is an inexorable law in the conduct of a Soviet soldier. Under any, at times the most dangerous and difficult conditions he does what he should do and what he is obliged to do by the military oath, the military regulations and the commander's orders.

### 3. The Responsibility of Servicemen to Carry Out the Requirements of Military Discipline

For maintaining discipline the Soviet commanders have been granted disciplinary power. They are obliged to apply measures of persuasion and coercion to their subordinates within the limits of the rights granted them. A commander (superior) commands subordinates for reasonable initiative, industry, for feats and excellence in service.

The Disciplinary Regulations define the following commendations applied to soldiers and sailors: the announcing of a commendation; the lifting of a previously imposed disciplinary reprimand; the granting of one leave out of turn from the unit or ship to shore during the days and hours set by the unit commander for this; the presentation of certificates, valuable gifts or money; the presentation of a personal photo-

graph of the serviceman taken in front of the unfurled colors of the troop unit; the informing of the serviceman's homeland or place of previous employment of his exemplary execution of service duty and the received commendations; the awarding of the military rank of private first class (senior seaman); the awarding of the chest insignia of merit; the entry of the names of the soldiers and sailors in the honor book of the unit (ship); the granting to soldiers and sailors in regular service of a brief leave up to 10 days, not counting the time for traveling to the place of leave and back.

The commendations are an important means for strengthening discipline and they encourage the men to even better carry out their duties and show activeness and initiative. It is a matter of honor for each soldier and sailor to earn a commendation for irreproachable conduct and exemplary service.

In our army persuasion is the main method of indoctrination. But persuasion does not exclude coercive measures against those servicemen who are negligent in carrying out their military duty. Any infraction of discipline by a soldier has a lethal effect on the combat capability and readiness of subunit, unit or ship. For this reason the measures defined by the regulations are applied to undisciplined servicemen.

With the violating of discipline or public order by a soldier, the commander (superior) reminds him of the service duties and when necessary sets a disciplinary punishment. Here within the disciplinary powers given him, the commander can apply any reprimand or punishment which, in his opinion, will have the greatest indoctrinational effect on the serviceman who has committed the misdeed. The following penalties can be imposed on the soldiers and sailors: a comment; a reprimand; a strict reprimand; the loss of the next leave from the unit or from the ship; the assigning out of turn to service details (with the exception of assigning to guard duty, to a watch or alert duty) for up to five details; arrest and holding in the guardhouse for up to ten days; the loss of the chest insignia of merit; the loss of the military rank of private first class (senior seaman).

The Soviet commanders use these measures so that not only they who are being commended or punished but also all the remaining men realize why the commander has punished or commended. Here it would be advisable to show the students the service cards of their best comrades and urge the soldier and sailors to equal the pacesetters.

The listeners can be reminded that the servicemen bear criminal liability for the crimes committed on the basis of the existing legislation. Particularly severe military crimes are disobedience of a superior, the failure to carry out an order, absence without leave from the unit, desertion, the threat of weapons, the intentional destruction or damage of military property, violating the rules for standing alert duty or guard duty, the breaking of military and state secrecy and other crimes which can involve a lessening of combat readiness. The law set severe measures of punishment for each such crime.

For example, why is absence without leave even for a short time considered a severe crime? Because it directly and immediately influences the combat readiness of the subunit, unit or ship. In actuality, for example, would a tank crew be battleworthy if the driver at the essential moment was not in his place or an artillery crew if the gunner was absent? Of course not. This is why absence without leave is viewed

as a refusal of military service and as a flagrant violation of the military oath and military regulations.

...Pvt V. Rumyantsev in unit X was not absent without leave but he was late returning from leave. When he was asked why he had violated discipline, the soldier glibly answered:

"I was watching a new film in the city cinema. I very much wanted to know how it ended. Anyway, today is a day off and nothing is doing in the barracks..."

The soldier gave no thought that military service in maintaining the motherland's security knows no days off. At any moment the signal of a combat alert can be given and the personnel must immediately begin to carry out the combat mission. Imagine the following picture: the crew of the rocket launcher has been alerted but one of the men from this crew is still watching a funny movie.... Of course, Pvt Rumyantsev was reprimanded by the commander and this instance became a question of discussion at a Komsomol meeting. The fellow servicemen strictly condemned their comrade for a flippant attitude toward military service. He admitted his mistake and since has not committed any deviations from the requirements of military discipline.

The consumption of alcoholic beverages is an infamous violation of discipline and an extremely dangerous evil. It often becomes the reason for major accidents. Numbed by alcohol a soldier or sailor is not a battleworthy fighter. He cannot be entrusted with a weapon or with standing duty. A drunken serviceman behaves without dignity in public places and damages military honor. He is capable of giving away a military secret to the first person he may encounter.

Coarseness, foul language and improper relations between servicemen are also incompatible with the standards of communist morality and the requirements of the regulations. It is unacceptable when individual soldiers or sailors from earlier induction dates are disdainful of those who have served less, when they emphasize their "superiority" over them and seek illegal privileges and various indulgences for themselves. A decisive struggle must be waged against such phenomena. They are contrary to the traditions of friendship and military comradeship, they undermine the moral health of a collective and weaken its combat capability. In a close-knit collective, any instance of coarseness, improper relations or violations of the standards of our morality are sharply condemned by the members. This is not only a characteristic trait in the way of life of a Soviet military collective but also a requirement of the Internal Service Regulations which state that a serviceman must help comrades in word and deed and restrain them from unworthy actions.

Since the demands on military discipline have now increased extremely, even the slightest, seemingly very insignificant violations of it have become inadmissible. For example, take the observance of uniform regulations and the maintaining of exemplary appearance. A serviceman does not have the right to violate the established uniform, to appear wherever in a dirty, unironed or poorly tucked in uniform or in dirty footwear. The appearance of a soldier is no minor detail. This reflects his inner state and is an indicator of the ability and readiness to carry out military duty to the motherland. It is no accident that the people say: "Sloppy in formation, even worse in battle."

An important demand is the saluting by servicemen, Subordinates and juniors in rank salute first. This is not a mere formality. In saluting, our men pay respect to military rank and emphasize their belonging to the Soviet Armed Forces and their readiness to carry out any of the motherland's orders. The soldiers and commanders of the Soviet Armed Forces are comrades in military service.

The maintaining of high military discipline in the subunits, units and ships is inconceivable without the strict observance of the daily regimen by all servicemen. It outlines all the life and combat training of the personnel from reveille to taps. In the daily regimen everything is compulsory for the men and everything should be performed precisely and promptly. Any deviation from this violates the normal life of the subunit and tells negatively on the combat readiness of the unit or ship. The USSR Minister of Defense, Mar SU D. F. Ustinov, in a speech at a Komsomol report-election meeting in the Guards Motorized Rifle Regiment of the Guards Taman' Motorized Rifle Division imeni M. I. Kalinin emphasized: "To establish in each troop collective a discipline which is not sham but is highly aware and for this reason truly strong, to ensure proper order and the example set by all Komsomol members without exception--this is how the question is now."

Particularly high demands on discipline, military order and cultured behavior are placed on the Soviet military serving outside our nation. People abroad gain an impression of the Soviet Union, of all the Soviet people and their Army and Navy from the appearance and conduct of the Soviet soldiers and sailors, from how they observe the laws of the friendly states, respect their customs and behave vis-a-vis the indigenous population.

The sergeants and petty officers play a major role in maintaining firm proper order in the subunits, units and ships. They are the active, combat assistants of the officers in the training and indoctrination of subordinates and in the struggle for firm military discipline. Particularly important for them is a personal example in carrying out military duty and in observing the moral and ethical standards of conduct. Success in their work is largely determined by the ability to widely utilize in the training and indoctrination practices for the soldiers and sailors the tested principle of "Do as I do." The sergeants and petty officers are closest to the soldiers and sailors and have an opportunity to profoundly study their personal qualities, successes and shortcomings, to daily and hourly influence the maintaining of firm proper order and the strengthening of a healthy moral atmosphere in the collective.

In completing the material on the subject, it is possible to reemphasize that conscious military discipline is one of the most important components in combat readiness and a guarantee of the invincibility of our glorious Armed Forces and their ability to deal a proper rebuff to any aggressor. To sacredly carry out the legacy of the great Lenin, the demands of the CPSU and the USSR minister of defense on the maintaining of strong military discipline and unfailing order in the subunits, units and ships is the primary duty of each Soviet soldier as a citizen of the USSR and as a dependable defender of the motherland and the great victories of socialism.

During the hours of independent study, it is recommended that the students study the work of V. I. Lenin "Everyone Into the Struggle Against Denikin!" (PSS, vol 39, pp 46, 49, 55-56), "Letter to the Workers and Peasants On the Victory Over Kolchak" (PSS, vol 39, pp 152, 155-156), "On Labor Discipline" (PSS, vol 40, p 232); the USSR Consti-

tution (basic law) Articles 31, 32, 59-65); the speech of Comrade L. I. Brezhnev "Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 26th CPSU Congress and the Next Tasks of the Party in the Area of Domestic and Foreign Policy" ("Materialy XXVI s"yezda KPSS," pp 63, 64, 66-68); the speech of the USSR Minister of Defense, Mar SU D. F. Ustinov at the Komsomol report-election meeting of the Guards Motorized Rifle Regiment of the Guards Taman' Motorized Rifle Division imeni M. I. Kalinin (KRASNAYA ZVEDZDA 10 December 1981); the 11th chapter of the textbook for political exercises "Na strazhe Rodiny" [On Guard for the Motherland] (Voyenizdat, 1978).

During the talk, the following questions should be raised for the listeners: 1. What demands did V. I. Lenin make on the discipline of the workers and Army and Navy personnel? 2. What is the essence of Soviet military discipline and on what is it based? 3. What is the fundamental difference of Soviet military discipline from the procedures in the armies of the capitalist states? 4. Why are the demands on the discipline of a soldier growing under present-day conditions? 5. What is stated in the oath and regulations about a serviceman's discipline? 6. Why is it essential to unquestioningly carry out the orders of commanders and superiors and be a disciplined soldier?

#### Literature for Propagandists

1. V. I. Lenin, "Everyone Into the Struggle Against Denikin!" PSS, Vol 39, p 46, 49, 55-56.
2. V. I. Lenin, "Letter to the Workers and Peasants on the Victory Over Kolchak," PSS, vol 39, pp 151-159.
3. V. I. Lenin, "On Labor Discipline," PSS, vol 40, p 232.
4. "Konstitutsiya" [USSR Constitution (Basic Law)], Articles 31, 32, 59-65.
5. L. I. Brezhnev, "Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 26th CPSU Congress and the Next Tasks of the Party in the Area of Domestic and Foreign Policy," "Materialy XXVI s"yezda KPSS," pp 63-64, 66-68.
6. L. I. Brezhnev, "Speech at the 17th USSR Trade Union Congress," PRAVDA, 17 March 1982.
7. L. I. Brezhnev, "Memoirs. The Chapter 'A Feeling For the Motherland,'" KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL, No 1, 1982, pp 7-19.
8. "O Dal'neyshem uluchshenii ideologicheskoy, politiko-vospitatel'noy raboty. Postanovleniye TsK KPSS ot 26 aprelya 1979 goda" [On Further Improving Ideological and Political Indoctrination. Decree of the CPSU Central Committee of 26 April 1979], Politizdat 1979.
9. "On the 60th Anniversary of the Formation of the USSR. Decree of the CPSU Central Committee," PRAVDA, 21 February 1982.
10. D. F. Ustinov, "Speech at the Komsomol Report-Election Meeting of the Guards

Motorized Rifle Regiment of the Guards Taman' Motorized Rifle Division imeni  
M. I. Kalinin,"KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 10 December 1981.

11. A. A. Yepishev, "A High Historical Mission," KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 23 February 1982.

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## ARMED FORCES

### TROOP INDOCTRINATION TOPICS FOR 1982-1983 DESCRIBED

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 7, Apr 82 (signed to press 19 Mar 82) p 84

[Unattributed article: "For the Attention of Leaders of Political Exercise Groups"]

[Text] We would remind the leaders of political exercise groups that in accord with the plans worked out by the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy, the second subject of each half year of the 1982 and 1983 training years is to be studied in the soldier and sailor groups according to periods of service using the reserve time. Six hours are allocated for each of the subjects. It is recommended that the exercises be conducted using the method of a lecture and a lively, full discussion. The allocated time should be distributed as follows: two hours assigned for the lecture, two for independent study and two for a discussion.

Soldiers and sailors in the first year of service are to study the subject "The Soviet Armed Forces--A School of Ideological Conditioning, Military Skill, High Discipline, Combat Friendship and Comradeship." An outline for this subject was published in issue number 21 of the journal KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in 1981. It is also possible to use the article "A School of Life, A School of Indoctrination" published in issue number 11 of our journal in 1980.

The soldiers and sailors in the second period of instruction are to study the subject "Soviet Laws On the Responsibility of Servicemen for Violating the Procedures for Serving in the USSR Armed Forces." An outline for this subject "Soviet Laws on Military Service" has been published in issue number three of KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL for 1982.

Soldiers and sailors in the third period of service are to study the subject "Proper Relationships between Servicemen--An Important Condition for Solidarity and Combat Teamwork in a Military Collective." An outline for this subject has been published in issue number four of KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL for 1982.

Soldiers and sailors in the fourth period of service are to study the subject "To Be an Example in Carrying Out Military Duty, to Help Comrades in Mastering Military Skills." An outline for this subject was given in issue number 21 of KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in 1981. It is also possible to use the article "To Securely Defend the Socialist Fatherland" found in issue number 20 of the journal for 1981.

At the end of the training period, prior to being discharged into the reserves, the soldiers and sailors in the fourth period of service are to study the subject "Always Be Ready to Defend the Peaceful, Creative Labor of the Soviet People, the Cause of Peace and Socialism." An outline of this subject was printed in issue number five of KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in 1982.

The political directorates of the Armed Services, the districts, groups of forces and fleets are permitted to make supplements in the training plans considering the specific military-political situation, the nature of service and the tasks being carried out by the personnel.

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## ARMED FORCES

### EDITORIAL KEYED TO MILITARY REGULATIONS

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 27 Mar 82 p 1

[Editorial: "Regulation Order"]

[Text] Every day in the army and navy is marked by intensive military work. In their desire to arrange a fitting reception for the 60th anniversary of the founding of the USSR, Soviet fighting men are persistently mastering the equipment and weapons and learning how to use them effectively in modern combat. The intensive combat training and the increased responsibility of the Soviet Armed Forces for the homeland's security in the deteriorated international situation demand of the military cadres, good ideological steadfastness, professional skill, organization and discipline. Firm military order is an extremely important condition for the successful accomplishment of training and service tasks and the strengthening of combat readiness.

This order, which embraces all aspects of military life, has absorbed the combat experience and the experience of peacetime, the recommendations of military science and the demands made of the homeland's armed defenders by the party and the people. Legally prescribed in the general military regulations, it is distinguished by simplicity and precision and by great expediency, and it assures that the subunits, units and ships are constantly combat-ready and supports their daily life and work and the planned training and indoctrination process. Where firm regulation order is maintained, the achievements in the training and service are greater, the military collectives are more closely united and vigilance and combat readiness are stronger.

The missile division commanded by Major A. Korostelev, for example, is distinguished by its firm regulation order. The commander, the staff, party and Komsomol organizations there do everything possible to see that interrelations among the men, order in the barracks and on the post strictly conform to the demands contained in the regulations. The efforts of officers, warrant officers and sergeants are constantly focused upon the maintaining of order. There have been no gross violations of military discipline in the battalion for a long time. It rightly bears the title of excellent battalion.

Organization, discipline and absolute obedience to commanders and chiefs are the determining factor behind regulation order. This assures strict order of subordination, good mobility for the fighting men and precise control of the troops and naval forces. To achieve regulation interrelations among the personnel in the sub-unit and unit and on the ship is to accomplish the main task involved in maintaining regulation order.

Unfortunately, there are those who have still not properly understood the importance of this. Some officers will give orders to a soldier, bypassing his immediate superior--a sergeant or petty officer--when there is no special need to do so. A chief is sometimes reproached in the presence of his subordinates for shortcomings in the service. Certain officials cannot control their emotions when they encounter this or that error on the part of a subordinate. The Internal Service Regulations of the Soviet Armed Forces, however, precisely specify: "All servicemen are required to be polite and to demonstrate restraint in their dealings with each other." They go on to state that in service matters they are to address each other with the polite form of the pronoun "you."

The sole commander, who is vested with disciplinary authority and relies upon the military collective's strength of influence, has the crucial role in the establishment of firm regulation order. And it is important that the commander himself, no matter what his rank, know the regulations thoroughly, irreproachably adhere to their principles in his practical work and constantly combine a high level of demandingness of subordinates with concern for them.

It is just this aspect of the matter which has received the attention of many of our readers during the discussion of a letter with the title "We Cannot Accept This," from Guards Captain S. Kapitonov, commander of a motorized rifle battalion. Analyzing the causes of a lagging on the part of one subunit, Major General I. Goryachikh, for example, writes the following: "Regulation principles were frequently violated there. Little concern was shown for the men, although there was no shortage of various kinds of prohibitions. Among other things, the commander forbade the granting of off-base leaves for the personnel."

Unfortunately, such "indoctrinational" measures, which run counter to the requirements contained in the regulations, are still in effect in some subunits. Certain officers attempt to instill regulation order by means of sheer bureaucratic rule, yelling and crudeness. This has occurred in certain units of the Pacific Fleet. At the same time, the units had instances of laxity, lack of demandingness and indifference to infractions of the regulations on the part of certain officials. These things cannot be tolerated. Each of them should be assessed from a standpoint of principle by superior commanders, in the political organs and party organizations.

In order to insure that every serviceman irreproachably fulfills his duties, he must be placed into an atmosphere of strict military order, regulation organization of the combat training of the entire life of the unit, ship or military educational institution. It is important to enlarge the role of the staffs in the accomplishment of these tasks and to make their control more effective. We must

resolutely stamp out all violations of the daily schedule, all instances of indifference toward the organization of combat and political training, garrison, guard, internal, ship and motor-pool services, any lack of respect for the drill training and military ceremonies. Officials responsible for maintaining organization and order in the subunits should be held strictly accountable, and they should be provided with on-the-spot assistance.

Focused party-political work is expected to help accomplish these tasks. It should develop in the officers a sense of responsibility for the strengthening of military discipline and for the application of the regulations in the lives of the fighting men. At the same time, it is important that each serviceman understand that his military work has to do with insuring the security of the world's first socialist state, of the entire socialist commonwealth, and that it is inconceivable for him to fulfill the important tasks assigned to him without a high level of organization and discipline, without irreproachable adherence to the requirements set forth in the oath and the regulations. We must make fuller use of the indoctrinal possibilities of socialist competition, an inseparable part of which is the struggle for honor, for irreproachable conduct, exemplary appearance and conformity to military ethics. It is important that all communists and Komsomol members be active champions of regulation order.

It is an extremely important task of the officers, warrant officers (praporshchik, michman), of all military cadres, to strive tirelessly to enhance the role of organization and regulation order in the achievement of excellent results in the training and service, socialist competition and the strengthening of vigilance and combat readiness.

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BIASED BEHAVIOR CRITICIZED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 28 Mar 82 p 2

[Article by Lt Col (Ret) I. Moshkovskiy: "Once More About Something Amiss"]

[Text] In April of last year KRASNAYA ZVEZDA carried a report with the headline "Something Amiss." It told how Major V. Katyshev, deputy commander for political affairs, substituted harsh administrative measures for indoctrinational work with the youth. Wherever such thing occurs, morale drops and initiative dies. This style of work, if I may, frequently results in substantial loss of morale.

Almost a year has gone by since then. This has been enough time to derive the correct lessons from what happened, to restructure things. We thought so. Quite recently, however, the editors received a second letter from that same military unit. Like the first, it told about crudeness and lack of tact on the part of officer Katyshev. I wanted to know just what was behind the brief, disturbing letter.

Several days spent among the personnel, talks with officers and soldiers and finally, the very climate of caution which existed there told me that the author of the letter to KRASNAYA ZVEZDA had acted in accordance with his conscience. Major Katyshev continues to act in a twisted manner in his work with his subordinates. It is the unanimous opinion that the people try to avoid attracting his attention any more than they have to for fear of receiving a dressing down, of hearing offensive words. Only when they are summoned will they cross the threshold of the political worker's office. They cross over it without any desire to do so. They know in advance that they will leave with their feelings upset. Numerous instances have convinced them of this.

There is perhaps no Komsomol member in the subunit with greater prestige than Sergeant N. Rodin. He is first in the training and an indispensable person in the public work. This is why his colleagues respect him. Officer Katyshev has a different attitude toward Rodin. The political worker did not care for the fact that the sergeant was troubled by frequently unjustified disruptions in the rehearsals of the amateur musical ensemble or for his attempt to somehow revitalize the Komsomol work. The fact that the letter to the newspaper editors was signed by Rodin evoked a special outpouring of negative emotions, however. The political worker now takes advantage of every excuse to reproach and belittle the subordinate.

"The time for your discharge into the reserve is drawing near," Katyshev frequently says sneeringly. "You will come to me for a reference...."

He will not tolerate criticism of himself. During that first visit, while many unanswered questions still held me in the unit, Major Katyshev, I learned later, summoned the Komsomol members and threatened them in an attempt to find out who had written the letter. Incidentally, the various questionings and clarifications have still not stopped. One has the impression that his desire to "close the mouths of the complainers" at any cost is preventing the officer from taking a self-critical look at his actions, of doing his best in his party and service position. Hardly a day goes by without "breakdowns," which engender unhealthy expectations in the collective and harm morale.

For some time Private V. Litvinov has been in disfavor with officer Katyshev. And only because he "dared to wash some dirty linen in public," telling a correspondent about one fairly unpleasant incident. It happened this way. One time the young soldier was assigned the duty of boiler tender. Busy with his work, he failed to see Major Katyshev approach:

"Why aren't you issuing orders"?

"There is no one else here, nothing but boilers..." Litvinov said in an attempt to justify himself. His words were drowned out by a torrent of furious words, however.

Another incident is extremely indicative of the situation. Lieutenant of Medical Service N. Shcherbachenko prescribed bed rest for Junior Sergeants B. Bushmakin and A. Mamedov.

"I don't believe they are sick," Major Katyshev stated and immediately ordered that the patients be taken from their beds and the thermometer seized. He then found himself in an awkward situation. He did not consider it necessary to apologize, however. Nor did he apologize another time, when he doubted that the doctor himself was ill. Once, prior to departing for a seminar of leaders of political training groups, Lieutenant of Medical Service Shcherbachenko asked Major Katyshev to exempt him from making the trip. He did not feel well at all and the trip would be a long one.

"You have to go!" Katyshev ordered.

The young officer became even sicker on the road. He ended up in a hospital instead of at the seminar, and was confined to his bed for a month.

These examples invoke sad thoughts, because Katyshev's conduct in no way conforms to the established ideas about what a political worker should be like--a person with a great sense of party duty, who just naturally combines a concern and sensitive attitude toward the people with service and moral irreproachability.

One automatically recalls some lines from a response to the report "Something Amiss," written to the editors by Comrade B. Burkin. It was essentially a letter

of praise for Major Katyshev: "a conscientious political worker," who "...has good service references." It would appear that the superior comrades were simply not aware of the true state of affairs and had passed superficial judgment of the communist-and-leader's qualities.

This time the correspondent was followed by the chief of the political section and other comrades. Step by step, they learned of numerous unbecoming acts on the part of Major Katyshev. It is too bad that this was not done earlier, following the newspaper's first article. They would undoubtedly have succeeded in correcting the officer and improving morale in the unit in good time.

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## ARMED FORCES

### MARCH MAILBAG REVIEWED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 2 Apr 82 p 2

[ "The KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Mailbag" ]

[Text] In March of 1982 the editors received 12,610 letters from readers, 416 of which were printed in the newspaper. There were 1,057 letters in response to the KRASNAYA ZVEZDA articles.

"Comrade L. I. Brezhnev's speech at the 17th Congress of Trade Unions of the USSR," a letter from Major Yu. Alisov states, "is permeated with concern for Soviet man, for peace on earth. It was greeted with fervent approval by our fighting men. The present international situation, in which militaristic forces are nudging mankind onto the path of 'cold war' and dangerous balancing on the brink of a real war, obligates us, the homeland's sentries, to triple our vigilance."

This is just one of numerous letters to the editors patriotically responding to Comrade L. I. Brezhnev's speeches at the trade union congress and at a formal meeting in Tashkent. The authors of the letters unanimously and fervently support the party's course, defined at the 26th CPSU Congress and aimed at the achievement of steady improvement of the Soviet people's well being and their cultural level, at the continued flourishing of all our country's Union republics, nations and nationalities, toward the strengthening of the homeland's economic and defensive strength.

Fighting men, blue- and white-collar workers of the army and navy are reporting on how the study of Comrade L. I. Brezhnev's speeches is progressing and expressing their desire to implement our party's course with daily practical deeds, to do their bit to improve the combat readiness of the Soviet Armed Forces.

More and more reports are presently arriving from the units and subunits on the successes achieved by units, ships and subunits in the combat and political training during the final phase of the winter training period. Competition among the personnel for a fitting reception for the 60th anniversary of the founding of the USSR became especially intense during this phase. In the friendly, multinational families, which the military units and subunits constitute, the homeland's defenders mature, acquire the skills essential to them in modern combat and sacredly preserve and add to the traditions of the frontline fighters.

Many letters seem to be responding to each other. Take Lieutenant Colonel (retired) I. Golovin of Kurganskaya Oblast and Captain P. Kochnev of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, for example. "In the Guards regiment in which I served as deputy commander for political affairs during the war," writes Comrade Golovin, "there were fighting men of 19 of our nation's nationalities and ethnic groups. They fought the enemy shoulder to shoulder, setting marvelous examples of bravery. Ukrainian Guards Senior Sergeant Aleksandr Korobchuk blocked the embrasure of an enemy pillbox with his body, for which he was posthumously awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union. This great title was also awarded to Guards Junior Sergeant Vladimir Zharkov, valorous son of the Russian people. This kind of friendship among fighting men of all the nationalities and their fighting cohesion made the regiment a strong combat unit, which knew no defeats in its engagements with the enemy."

As though responding to the frontline fighter, Captain P. Kochnev writes about the combat friendship of today's generation of fighting men. "This tradition," he stresses, "is especially graphically manifested in the company commanded by Senior Lieutenant S. Konyushenko, a Ukrainian. His deputy for political affairs is Senior Lieutenant B. Gabdullin, who comes from Kazakhstan. More than 10 nationalities serve in the company. 'One for all and all for one,' is the principle by which the fighting men live. And this helps them to achieve great success in the training."

Reports have come in from all the districts, groups of forces and fleets on the successes achieved in the competition for a fitting reception for the 60th anniversary of the founding of the USSR. Guards Captain O. Kalinchikov wrote about the skillful actions of the men of an antiaircraft subunit during the exercise. A commentary by Warrant Officer A. Fabritskiy notes the successes achieved by the fighting men of an air unit. Guards Lieutenant I. Naumenko reported on the skillful fire control displayed by Senior Lieutenants A. Korobkov and A. Baranov in exercises involving live firing.

Last month's mail also brought reports on how personnel of the units, ships, military educational institutions and military installations are preparing for a Saturday of unpaid mass work. The military construction workers and repairmen have decided to work at their jobs without pay, exceeding the normal output quotas. Personnel of the units and ships are planning to do a great deal to renovate and improve the training materials base.

The March mail contained numerous requests and questions and reports on shortcomings in the organization of the training and indoctrinal process and the supplying of servicemen with all the types of rations, pay and allowances due them. Part of these letters were printed in the newspaper, while others were sent to the appropriate authorities for review and on-the-spot action.

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## ARMED FORCES

### PROBLEMS OF PARTY CONTROL DISCUSSED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 18 Apr 82 p 2

[Article by Col V. Fomin, Order of Lenin Moscow Military District: "Control as a System"]

[Text] Demonstrating the benefit of control today is exactly like breaking down an open door. Any, even an only slightly trained, party secretary knows that in order for a decision to produce practical results, one must organize its implementation and see that it is understood by the personnel and carried out by them, completely and on time.

It is a question of something else--how to establish rigid control, what to control and how to do it. This is where, in my view, real difficulties arise.

The battalion commanded by Major M. Ivanov lagged in its field training. Additional possibilities were "found" for the battalion, and it was at the training center a month longer than the others. How was this time utilized for productive combat training?

If one is to believe the battalion commander, the time was not wasted. If one is to believe.... In fact, however, as it turned out, not a single such report by Major Ivanov was to be believed. The same was true of reports compiled at his instructions.

For example, the class schedule indicated that the fighting men had performed a fire training exercise, while they had in fact been hard at work building a garage for one of Major Ivanov's acquaintances. And excellent rating was entered in the combat training log for Private N. for allegedly performing skillfully in an exercise involving defense against weapons of mass destruction, whereas Private N. was during that very time wielding a spade and a brick trowel at the current construction project.

What about the battalion communists? Their secretary, Major V. Nizhnik? What was their position? Nothing was wrong. They conducted a party meeting on "current tasks," adopted a decision, organized its fulfillment and "fulfilled it, completely and on time." They outlined plans, for example, for conducting a talk with the personnel on the role of military discipline in maintaining a high level of combat

readiness. They conducted the meeting. They decided to renew the visual agitation at the training center. And they did. In short, the party organization fulfilled its decisions. Little good came of all this work, however, if there was no party concern for the quality of the combat training, for its end results. That is, for the most important reason for taking the battalion to the training center.

I point out the fact that members of the unit staff and comrades from the party committee were in the battalion during that time. From all indications, however, some of them took a formal attitude to the state of affairs in the subunit, while others took satisfaction from the fact that checkmarks indicating fulfillment stood beside most points in the party work plan for the field training period.

Just what should be controlled, then, and how? What is the most important thing? What should be given priority? These are not just idle questions. In fact, party organizations are expected to handle large and diverse tasks, and they have to make many decisions. But let us first ask ourselves: Do these decisions in fact always reflect the most vital matters concerning the life of the subunits? Do they actually meet current needs? Are they in the channel of general party concerns, of instructions from superior commanders and political organs? Is the political, the party approach to matters always visible in them, as though projected onto the specific situation?

Control over execution is a broad concept. It seems to me that it is not just a matter of checking on those decisions coming out of party meetings and sessions of the party committees and party bureaus, which are in response, so to speak, to the present moment. There are, after all, issues basic to the party organization. They are not resolved with one or two measures. They are not realized by a specific deadline, but they must nonetheless be at the focus of attention of the communists, always be under the constant, unweakened control of each party organization, of each party organ. Take, as an example, the matter of intensifying the training process. What has to be done today? What can be done tomorrow? What sort of bottlenecks are there, and how can they be eliminated?

Or take the restructuring of ideological work. This is also an area requiring the party organization's constant control. Who, if not it, is to combat bureaucracy and formalism in the political classes, to keep boredom and dullness out of ideological measures, to resolutely rebuff those who are fond of sliding over the surface of things? I believe that the party organization should have a long-range view and a precise program, in order to achieve success in this area.

And there are numerous such problems. Summarizing and applying progressive know-how (take a look at how much routine and red tape there are in this matter), uniting the military collectives, maintaining a wholesome moral climate in them.... And are questions of intraparty work being correctly resolved? Is everything the way it should be with our party meetings? Have they become, in the words of Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, a place "where all of life's trepidations should be honestly discussed," or do the party members come to the meetings only to sit out the prescribed number of hours and to listen to speakers scheduled in advance? Are criticism and self-criticism always honored in the meetings? Is respect always

shown for the opinion of every communist? Is consideration given to every valuable suggestion? There are party committees and bureaus, for which the requirements set forth in the well-known decree passed by the CPSU Central Committee "On the Practical Conduct of Party Meetings in the Yaroslavl' City Party Organization" are now, in the words of certain comrades, "ground already covered."

"We have long since stopped exercising control over this matter. A great deal of time has gone by since then." This is the opinion of Major S. Fed'kin, a party committee member, as an example.

Yes, it was almost 13 years ago when this document was made public. Its importance is not limited to a time frame, however. "We stopped exercising control...." It is not surprising, in light of a statement like this, that the party organization of the battalion commanded by Major Ivanov showed little initiative under the protection, so to speak, of the party committee.

No, the matters of militancy on the part of party organizations, exemplary performance by party members and purity of the party ranks are not limited to a certain timespan. They must be constantly under the control of each party committee, each political organ, each communist.

It is certainly not an easy matter to establish effective control. Along with the traditional forms of control (inspections, reports and so forth) we must engage constantly in a creative quest for new and more effective methods, which produce the greatest practical results. It is also essential--and this matter was mentioned at the 26th CPSU Congress--to create a precise system of control, which will assure that there is truthful and objective information on the state of affairs in specific sections and make it possible to eliminate shortcomings promptly and effectively.

Some interesting experience in this area has been accumulated in the unit in which Major Ye. Pekishev is member of the party committee. The party committee exercises control over the main areas of the work and over what is being done to accomplish the tasks involved. How does it manage this? By means of standard plan. This plan was made up by Major V. Blokhin, an instructor with the political section, and submitted to the party committee for use on an experimental basis. It covers all the measures which should be conducted in the subunit party organizations, by way of fulfilling decisions of the party committee and the regimental meeting of the communists. It specifies the days on which control work is to be performed and the sections which are to be checked. This makes it possible to pursue a common course, to promptly and efficiently reveal the elements and sections which are lagging behind and to bring them up to the level of the best ones. The focused nature of the control has a good effect upon the work style of the party organizations, increases the communists' sense of responsibility and develops them as active fighters for the party. I believe that the party committee, which assures that the communists are in the vanguard of the training and the service, has had a great deal to do with the fact that the regiment has achieved good results in the combat and political training for a number of years.

A system of control.... It seems to me that this term is of basic importance. It reflects, after all, not just the requirement that the implementation of decisions be periodically checked. It means something incomparably greater than this. It means the creation of that specific system which assures good control, under which control vigorously stimulates action.

I believe that the need is upon us to work out a number of new evaluation indices, new criteria for objective control. I would like to take advantage of this opportunity to say about this matter that the practical workers could be greatly assisted with this task by the military scientists working on theoretical and practical problems of party-political work in the army and navy. We share this cause in common, after all.

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ARMED FORCES

SERVICEMEN IN ELECTIONS OF JUDGES

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 24 Apr 82 p 2

[Article: "The Procedure for Participating in Elections"]

[Text] The procedure by which servicemen participate in elections of rayon (city) people's courts has been clarified in accordance with principles set forth in the Constitution of the USSR, laws governing the court system and other normative enactments. They take part in the elections on an equal basis with all citizens, ordinarily at the site of the military units.

Electoral wards for the corresponding territorial electoral districts are formed in the units for purposes of holding elections of people's judges. The composition of the electoral commission for a ward is established by the ispolkom of the local soviet of people's deputies. People's judges are elected by secret ballot for a term of 5 years. Servicemen who are away from the military post on election day vote in the electoral districts in which they are located at that time.

People's assessors for people's courts are elected from among the servicemen in the military units, this being coordinated with the ispolkoms of the local soviets of people's deputies. Elections are by open balloting at general meetings of military personnel. If there is an insufficient number of electors in one military unit, the elections are conducted with participation by the servicemen of a number of units. People's assessors are elected for a term of 2 and 1/2 years.

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## ARMED FORCES

### ON BASE EXCHANGE FACILITIES

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 24 Apr 82 p 2

[Article: "To Improve the Service"]

[Text] The legal status of the public agencies involved has been reviewed for purposes of further strengthening public control over the operations of military trade enterprises.

By decision of the garrison chief (or the senior officer of a military post) public control commissions are formed at garrisons and military posts from among personnel of the units located there. Public control groups are formed by open balloting at consumer conferences (or general meetings of the unit personnel) at each store, dining hall, snack bar and workshop and at other military trade enterprises. They are elected for a term of 1 year. A commission is made up of at least five people, a group--as necessary for a weekly inspection of the trade enterprise, but of no fewer than seven people. The group elects its chairman and his deputy.

The commanders and political organs concerned are charged with organizing the commissions and groups and supervising their work. Public controllers interact closely with people's control and other controlling agencies. They help command and the management of military trade organizations to improve trade and personal services for the military personnel and other residents of the garrisons and posts, monitor the observance of rules governing trade and the functioning of the enterprises and the fulfillment of plans for bringing in and distributing goods, see to it that socialist property is protected and that the goods and materials are used with thrift and economy, and help to introduce progressive kinds of service for customers, initiators of orders and clients.

Specific rights and duties have been defined, as well as the procedure by which the public control commissions and groups operate. At least once every 6 months they report to the customers on their work. Special identification cards are issued to the commission and group members by political organs.

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ARMED FORCES

HOUSING PROBLEM AIRED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 24 Apr 82 p 2

[Article by Maj V. Basok: "Why Did They Reject the Request?"]

[Text] No, Ol'ga Nikitichna did not end up in the small military post by accident at all. She began her working career in 1941 in the dining hall for aeronautical engineering personnel of an air regiment. She met her true love there. And so, her apartment is the same one which was once offered to the family of military pilot Chernovanchenko, that is, to Ol'ga Nikitichna and her husband.

Years have gone by, however. Her husband died. They had no children. And the woman was left to live alone in her separate two-room apartment. This is why she decided to move closer to her relatives, and for this purpose, to exchange her apartment--even for a smaller one, but there where her own people lived. Luckily, there were military airmen in that city, and the exchange could therefore be made within a single department. This was extremely convenient.

Ol'ga Nikitichna shared these thoughts with the regimental commander and other officials, and they all understood. Officer V. Abramov, for example, asked the deputy commander for construction and billeting of troops for the Kiev Military District to allocate a one-room apartment for Chernovanchenko out of the housing located in garrison "X" of the air unit. Nor did the commander of that unit object. But then, Ol'ga Nikitichna received a letter stating the following: "Considering the exceptionally difficult situation with respect to providing housing for the families of servicemen at garrison "X," it does not appear possible to satisfy your request that a one-room apartment be made available."

The letter was signed by Engineer-Colonel D. Khmura, chief of the KEU [billetting directorate] for the Kiev Military District. Frankly, the letter disheartened not only Ol'ga Nikitichna, but also everyone who had taken a part in her efforts. Exchanging a two-room for a one-room apartment would appear to be extremely beneficial for the airmen precisely because a difficult housing situation had developed in a number of places. As it turned out, however, the entire problem lay in the fact that Ol'ga Nikitichna lived in a military post located not in the Kiev but in the Odessa Military District, and the local KECh [billetting unit] would receive nothing in exchange.

I would like to believe that the handling of O. N. Chernoivanchenko's request will still be reconsidered in the Kiev Military District. There is yet another aspect to the story, after all. Today, people who were formerly closely connected with the army but who for various reasons no longer have these service or working ties are leaving many of the military posts. The job of resettling these individuals and their families in nearby cities and settlements involves numerous objective difficulties. And we should not increase these difficulties by adding other problems created by departmental, localistic considerations.

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AIR DEFENSE FORCES

UNIT'S IMPROVEMENT IN TRAINING NOTED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 15 Apr 82 p 1

[Article by Lt Col V. Kir'yazov: "From the Stragglers--to the Leaders"]

[Text] The commander of the surface-to-air missile subunit, Major S. Murenya, belongs among those people of whom it is said: a lucid mind and clever fingers. On the combat equipment he can accomplish any point of prescribed maintenance work with quality, show the sections procedures for efficient work, and eliminate a difficult malfunction.

At one time, the subunit of which we are speaking won the title of "excellent" in the unit. But three years ago, it surrendered its position and only received a satisfactory grade on the range. The former commander was unable to mobilize his subordinates for the successful accomplishment of socialist obligations.

It was then that Major Murenya was assigned to the straggling subunit. A party meeting soon took place here at which the communists posed acutely and in a business-like manner the question of returning its good name to the subunit. This, of course, required great work from each officer, warrant officer [praporshchik], sergeant, and soldier, but the goal was attained. Last year, in accomplishing a training-combat mission on the range the missilemen received a grade of "excellent." All personnel demonstrated high ability, and Junior Sergeant I. Babenkov literally stunned the instructors: under most difficult conditions he discovered a maneuvering, small target and created favorable conditions for the launcher control officer. They destroyed the target with a direct hit. Of course, Major Murenya was also equal to the occasion here. He directed the actions of his subordinates competently and skillfully. Captain A. Rovin showed himself to be a good organizer of party-political work under conditions as close as possible to those of combat.

The missilemen continued to work stubbornly and persistently even after the firings. All who should do so in accordance with the times pledged to raise their ratings this spring. Major Murenya also assumed such an obligation. And he was the first to set an example for his subordinates, passing the test for master. Nor did his subordinates lag behind the commander. Now they all have raised their rating qualification.

Major Murenya was especially pleased for Engineer-Lieutenant N. Kas'yanov. The latter had gaps in special training quite recently. Major Murenya took over control of the young officer's training. They sat together for hours over diagrams and in

the vans of the complex. With the assistance of the commander, Kas'yanov overcame his lagging and raised his rating.

The presentation of state awards became an important and joyous event in the life of the subunit: to Major Murenya--the Order of the Red Star, and to Captain Rovin and Junior Sergeant Babenkov--the medal "For Combat Services."

These days, the missilemen of the subunit are struggling even more persistently for new successes in the competition for a worthy greeting for the 60th anniversary of the formation of the USSR. On the eve of Air Defense Forces Day a competition took place in the unit for the best indices in combat work. Also among the prize winners were sections from the subunit commanded by Major Murenya.

Photo caption: In the photo--Major S. Murenya, Captain A. Rovin, and Junior Sergeant I. Babenkov. [photo not reproduced]

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AIR DEFENSE FORCES

EDITORIAL KEYED TO FIRE TRAINING

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 7 May 82 p 1

[Editorial: "Exemplary Organization for Missile Firings"]

[Text] Tactical exercises with actual launchings of missiles are rightly called the highest form of combat training for the personnel and an inspection of the actual readiness of the subunits, units, and ships for the accomplishment of varied missions in a situation as close as possible to a combat situation. On them, the professional ability, moral-political training, the psychological and physical tempering of the men of the Armed Forces, the coordination of the sections, crews, and subunits, and the ability of commanders and staffs to ensure clear and effective control of subordinates under conditions of dynamic and strained contemporary battle are checked in accordance with the highest criteria.

In struggling for the complete accomplishment of the obligations in the competition for a worthy greeting for the 60th anniversary of the formation of the USSR, the missilemen of all services of the Armed Forces attained certain successes in the winter training period in improving combat skill. Evidence of this is their skillful actions on tactical exercises which were concluded with live training missile launchings. High training and the ability for the sniper-like destruction of the target in a situation as close as possible to one of combat were demonstrated by the subunits and units commanded by officers S. Pokrovskiy, A. Zolin, V. Nagornyy, V. Podgoretskiy, A. Kornilov, A. Oleynik, and others.

This year, tactical exercises with range missile launchings are being conducted under more difficult conditions. Requirements have been raised for the tactical-special and technical ability of the men, their knowledge of the combat capabilities of the missile complexes, means for the automated control system and radar reconnaissance, and the ability to use combat equipment effectively under the influence of heavy radio jamming, to accomplish long marches, and to conduct combat operations at night and on mountain and desert terrain. This obliges commanders, political organs, and staffs tirelessly to raise the quality of combat instruction and ensure the clear organization of training and the conduct of range firings.

On tactical exercises with missile firings, higher results are demonstrated by those subunits, units, and ships where commanders and staffs utilize the achievements of military science and troop practice actively and creatively, introduce leading experience, and organize the training process with consideration of contemporary requirements. Everything necessary for fruitful and effective training is at the

disposal of the men of the Armed Forces. It is important that in the period of preparation for missile launchings and on lessons, drills, and sea cruises the entire arsenal of training and simulation as well as special equipment which permits creating diverse variants of combat work in the process of which skills in servicing and employing the equipment under conditions of a shortage of time and in emergency and other difficult situations are sharpened be used with knowledge of the matter. The quality working out of training-combat missions and standards is the guarantee of successful range firings.

When preparing for tactical exercises and in the course of them, much should be done by the technical engineering personnel, the chiefs of services, and the flagship specialists. They are required to organize the quality check of the technical condition of armaments, electronic equipment, power plants, and other assemblies and mechanisms, ensure the quality accomplishment of preventive maintenance and tuning work, and check for the completeness of the spare parts kit with the necessary instruments and parts. In the struggle for the excellent technical condition of the missile complex and the readiness of all its systems for effective combat employment, a large role is played by socialist competition. Its capabilities and mobilizing force must be directed toward the quality accomplishment of the tasks and standards, the improvement of the specialists' professional skill, toward raising organization and discipline, and instilling in the men a sense of personal responsibility for success in the forthcoming difficult test.

The range has great capabilities for the comprehensive and objective checking of the personnel's ability. It is necessary to see that these capabilities are used in the best manner in the interests of improving methods to control the battle and a creative search for new, more effective methods for the combat employment, operation, and servicing of equipment and armaments. Here much depends on the range instructors as well as on the persons who have been entrusted with working out the conditions and procedure for the accomplishment of missions for live training missile launchings and evaluating the soldierly labor of the personnel of subunits and units. The instructiveness of the situation created on the exercises, the depth of analysis of combat work, and the objectivity of the evaluations depend on their professional competence and methodological skill.

The range is a school of advanced experience. Everything better which has been accumulated by troop practice in the training of the personnel is disclosed and generalized in the course of live firings. The strong and weak aspects in the training of the sections, crews, and command posts are displayed most clearly here, on the range. Each commander, staff officer, and political organ should use the range lessons to evaluate the effectiveness of the entire training and indoctrinational process and to compare the conformance of daily training with the tasks which are posed by an actual battle with a strong, technically equipped, and crafty enemy.

Unfortunately, some commanders are not doing everything for firings on the range to become a genuine school of skill for each missleman. Some officers, warrant officers [praporshchik and michman], and the sections which they head arrive at the range insufficiently prepared for operations under difficult conditions. In individual cases, in the drive for a high grade exercise directors embark on the path of simplification. They are creating a lightened situation for the trainees and select the most favorable weather conditions and time of day for the accomplishment of the

assigned missions. Of course, facts of this type require a strict and principled evaluation by senior commanders, political organs, and party organizations.

One of the most important conditions for success on the range is purposeful, continuous party-political work with the personnel. Its main goal is to ensure the personal example of the communists and Komsomols and to mobilize the men for the successful accomplishment of training-combat missions with high quality. Commanders, political organs, and party and Komsomol organizations should use the increased activity of the men, which is caused by preparations for a difficult examination, in every possible way so as to accomplish completely the socialist obligations which have been assumed for the period of the exercises and to make maximum use of the range's capabilities to improve the combat ability of the missilemen.

To mark the 60th anniversary of the formation of the USSR with new, higher positions in soldierly labor is the noble, patriotic aspiration of the men of the Armed Forces. The successful accomplishment of missile firings is a ponderable contribution to the attainment of this goal and to raising the combat readiness and strengthening the combat might of the Soviet Armed Forces.

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## DOSAAF AND MILITARY COMMISSARIATS

### TRAINING AND RELATED ACTIVITIES

#### Report on Seminar of 'Orlenok' Commanders

Moscow SOVETSKIY PATRIOT in Russian 1 Nov 81 p 1

[Article by V. Oleynik and I. Senetskaya: "A School of Courage, The All-Union Seminar for Commanders of the Komsomol's Orlenok Military Sport Game"]

[Text] The Komsomol Central Committee's Olimpiyets youth center has been the setting for an important five-day discussion by parties interested in finding ways to improve the Komsomol's Orlenok military sport game and enlarge its role in preparing and training worthy defenders of the motherland. Participating in this discussion were commanders, chiefs of republic, kray and oblast game staffs and representatives of organizations and departments which have organized the Orlenok game who had come to the capital for the All-Union seminar.

The Komsomol military sport game, its commander, Lieutenant General of Aviation G. Beregovoy, declared in his address, has become an effective method of indoctrinating students in general education schools and institutions of vocational and technical and specialized secondary training and education in the spirit of Soviet patriotism and proletarian internationalism, of tempering and conditioning them ideologically and physically and of preparing them for military service, labor and national defense.

He pointed out that after they have been called up for active military service, the young people who have come through the Orlenok school quickly find their place among the army's ranks, earn "outstanding" ratings in combat and political training and become rated specialists. Many of them demonstrated high degrees of military skill during the recent joint Army-Navy Zapad-81 exercise.

Game staff personnel have much to do to implement the decree of the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers, "Increase Mass Involvement in Physical Culture and Sports." The requirements contained in this decree are aimed directly at persons involved in organizing military sports activities for our youth.

Lieutenant General V. Mosyaykin, deputy chairman of the Central Committee, USSR DOSAAF, reported on the participation of DOSAAF organizations in the further development of the Orlenok military sport game. He pointed out that the committees and organizations of the defense society see their participation in putting on the game as an important part of their involvement in the military-patriotic indoctrination of our youth. Attention in this connection is devoted primarily to the applied military aspect of Orlenok.

Military-patriotic indoctrination and training implies an organic combination of the spiritual enrichment of our youth with patriotic ideas with a study of the basic principles of military affairs and practical training and preparation for discharging their honored obligation of service in the Soviet Armed Forces. It is precisely this task that defense society organizations are accomplishing.

The USSR DOSAAF Central Committee is giving continuous attention to participation on the part of defense society committees and primary collectives in the Orlenok military sports game. Military-patriotic activities conducted jointly with other organizations; providing youth army detachments with rifle ranges, weapons and ammunition; development of the material-technical base necessary for the "orlyata" [eaglets] to develop a mastery of technical specialties, publication of literature on methods and artistic productions concerning the Orlenok program--these things are far from amounting to any complete enumeration of the forms of DOSAAF participation in the development of this popular military sports game.

The task, V. Mosyaykin emphasized, consists in finding and employing new ways, exploiting new possibilities for achieving further improvement in our program of patriotic instruction and technical military training and preparation of our youth. Unresolved problems remain in this area.

The physical training we provide our young army men is still inadequate; not all are demonstrating solid skills in weapon fire and some of the other exercises in the GTO [Prepared for Labor and Defense] program. Considerably more attention needs to be given to indoctrinating our youth taking as a basis the heroic deeds performed in our own day and models of exemplary discharge of patriotic and international duty and of courage and intrepidity among the troops of today's armed forces. In a number of places we are still seeing inadequate use being made of the defense society's periodical publications and the motion pictures which have been produced on commission by the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee. It is necessary as well that we improve working arrangements with organs of the mass media.

More vigorous efforts will be needed to raise the level of the military knowledge and, especially, of the practical skills provided the upperclassmen of our secondary schools and the students of vocational and technical schools and technicums during their basic military training and to improve the physical and drill training given registrants. Defense society committees and organizations will be giving this important task their most undivided attention in the future as well.

Presenting reports to the seminar were Lieutenant General of Tank Troops A. Kirillov, first deputy chief, USSR Ministry of Defense directorate of civilian military training; V. Zakhavin, first deputy chairman, USSR Council of Ministers Committee on Physical Culture and Sports; Lieutenant Colonel N. Koshelev, deputy chief, Soviet Armed Forces Main Political Directorate for Komsomol Work and representatives of other organizations and departments involved in putting on the game. The seminar was also the occasion of a broad-ranging exchange of experience among Orlenok staff personnel.

Seminar participants visited DOSAAF training organizations around the capital. Major General D. Kuznetsov, chairman of the Moscow city DOSAAF committee, acquainted them with the training equipment and facilities of the motor vehicle and radio technicians' schools and the sports gun club. School and club directors, instructors and supervisors spoke to seminar participants about the work they do in preparing registrants for

service in the Armed Forces and showed them training classrooms, laboratories and other technical sports facilities.

An exhibition of military-patriotic literature and artisitic productions from the USSR DOSAAF publishing house was also set up at the Olimpiyets youth center.

### Lecture on Military Equipment

Moscow SOVETSKIY PATRIOT in Russian 11 Nov 81 p 2

[Article by A. Gur'yanov: "A Technically Well-Equipped Army, To Aid the Propagandist"]

[Text] Marxism-Leninism teaches that the popular masses must always be prepared with arms in hand to defend the cause of their revolution and to deal a decisive rebuff to any who dare to make an attempt upon its achievements. Any revolution, V. I. Lenin declared, can be said to be worth something only if it knows how to defend itself.

The founders of Marxism-Leninism inseparably linked an ability to wage a successful war in defense of the socialist fatherland with the economic potential of the opposing sides. "The whole organization of the armies involved and the weapons and equipment they employ," F. Engels wrote, "as well as victory and defeat themselves, prove to depend upon material, that is, economic, conditions: upon the human material and the weapons involved and, accordingly, upon the quality and size of the population and upon its equipment."

In the new historical epoch, V. I. Lenin pointed out, the dependence of the course and outcome of a war upon economic and sociopolitical conditions increases to an ever greater degree. No dark force, he emphasized, can prevail in the face of an alliance of representatives of science, the proletariat and technology. Vladimir Il'ich also set forth the primary means of technically equipping the armed forces of the Soviet state. These consisted first of all in developing and increasing the country's economic potential, developing a defense industry and in striving in every possible way to exploit advances in science and technology. V. I. Lenin called insistently for careful and comprehensive study of advances in foreign military technology, identification of trends in technical thinking and mastery of all types of weapons and all methods and means of waging war an enemy has or could have.

In demonstrating its unflagging concern for strengthening the country's defense capability, the Communist Party adheres unwaveringly to the directions Lenin laid down. On the basis of the industrialization of the country an enormous amount of progress was achieved in the period between the Civil War and the Great Patriotic War toward providing all services and branches of the Armed Forces with modern weapons and military equipment. Special attention was devoted in this connection to the development of aviation, armored and artillery technology. The high technical level at which the Soviet Army was equipped was one of the decisive factors in our world-historic victory in the Great Patriotic War.

As a result of the development of its heavy industry, precision instrument manufacturing, special metallurgy, atomic, electronic and rocket-propulsion industries, modern shipbuilding capacity and means of automation, the USSR has been able in the postwar period to create the preconditions necessary for production of the most important types of weapons, above all, of nuclear missiles. "The development by Soviet scientists

of powerful modern weapons in response to plots on the part of instigators of war," Comrade L. I. Brezhnev has pointed out, "put an end to imperialism's nuclear monopoly and made our country's defense invincible. At the same time it helped strengthen the positions of the forces of peace throughout the world and greatly increased the possibilities of our peacetime construction."

Implementation of Lenin's principles concerning the basic conditions and means of guaranteeing the defensive strength of the socialist state and the party's correctly chosen postwar policies in the spheres of economics, science and technology have made it possible for the Soviet Union to create a qualitatively new material-technical base, a basic and most important precondition for a technical revolution in military affairs.

In his address to the gala convocation marking the occasion of the 64th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution, Marshal D. F. Ustinov, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and USSR Minister of Defense, declared that "our devotion to peace presumes as well a most attentive, solicitous attitude toward national defense. To insure the country's security, to prevent war from breaking out requires the utmost in vigilance. It requires strength, and no mean strength at that. The Soviet Union possesses this strength."

The Soviet Armed Forces are equipped with modern weapons and military equipment.

All services of the Armed Forces are being developed in harmony with one another. Special attention is being given in this connection to development of our Strategic Rocket Forces, which constitute a powerful defensive means deterring an aggressor.

The mobility and fire and striking power of our Ground Forces have increased immeasurably in recent years. The motorized rifle formations (soyedineniye) we have today need no tank reinforcement, what with the fact that they themselves have more tanks than a tank corps did during the Great Patriotic War. The weight of a single artillery and mortar volley by today's motorized rifle division is 31 times greater than that of the rifle division of 1939. That their effective strength includes missile subunits (podrazdeleniye) capable of delivering nuclear strikes increases by many times the strength of the Ground Forces' motorized rifle formations.

The Tank Forces constitute the Ground Forces' primary striking force and a powerful weapon designed to accomplish the most critical missions in various types of combat operation. Of all the various branches of the Ground Forces, the Tank Forces are the best suited for rapid and maneuverable combat operations in situations involving the use of nuclear weapons. Tanks make the Ground Forces highly maneuverable and aggressive in combat, impart an offensive spirit and increase the depth of an attack, the rate of advance and the stability and solidity of combat formations.

With the mass-scale introduction of the missile, the postwar years saw the appearance of the rocket troops, which have been equipped with tactical and tactical-operational missiles. They are capable of delivering powerful and accurate nuclear-fire [yadernognevoy] strikes on any targets, targets which may be located anywhere from several tens to many hundreds of kilometers away.

Artillery of all types has been organically combined with the rocket forces. It is capable of large-scale operational and tactical maneuver and of providing reliable fire support for combined arms units (chast') and formations in all types of combat in any theater of military operations.

Our signal troops have undergone a period of substantial development. They now dispose of the most varied and up-to-date equipment enabling them to maintain continuous communications under any conditions.

The variety of highly efficient, high-capacity equipment coming into the engineer inventory is making it possible for our engineer troops successfully to construct defense lines, control points, river crossings and water supply points; set up obstacles; lay and clear minefields and accomplish other difficult and laborious tasks associated with troop combat operational support.

Our airborne troops, whose mission is to carry out operations in the enemy rear, have seen a period of rapid development in recent years. They dispose of the latest in weapons and equipment. Their inventory includes air-transportable self-propelled artillery, rockets and missiles, antitank and antiaircraft weapons, armored personnel carriers, automatic small arms and reliable means of communication and control. Airborne equipment makes it possible to drop troops and cargo under any weather conditions onto any terrain day and night.

The Air Defense Forces constitute an important service of the Soviet Armed Forces. Their mission is to protect the country and the armed forces against enemy air attack. The Air Defense Forces are equipped with modern systems for warning of the presence of an enemy in the air and powerful antiaircraft missiles, aircraft and radar capable of detecting and destroying targets at different altitudes, under adverse weather conditions, on near and distant approaches and in situations involving enemy use of ECM.

The rapid development of our Air Force is more evidence of the continuous concern the party and government demonstrate for increasing the combat strength of the country's Armed Forces. The Air Force's distinguishing characteristic is the constant improvement of its hardware inventory on the basis of extensive exploitation of advances achieved over the course of the revolution in science and technology and continuous qualitative modification and improvement in aviation hardware.

Missile-carrying aircraft now constitute the backbone of the Air Force. They have been equipped with the most up-to-date weapons, enemy detection and fire-control systems and navigation equipment. Recent years have seen the development of new multi-role, variable-wing-geometry aircraft and powerful vertical-takeoff-and-landing aircraft.

Successes in science and technology have had a decisive impact upon the nature of the development of our Navy. Atomic-powered submarines and missile-carrying naval aviation comprise the Navy's primary striking force. The Navy now has the capability of accomplishing operational and strategic missions.

The life and military mission of all services of our Armed Forces would be impossible without the existence of well-organized military rear services. The Soviet Armed Forces dispose of a fully motorized rear, which has enhanced the mobility and maneuverability of their components. Their railroad, motor transport and road-building and traffic-control troops and pipeline transport component have undergone a period of further development. Supply processes are now more mechanized, and medical and other support is being upgraded. A great deal has been done to improve our civil defense, which will play a substantially more important role in modern war.

The 26th CPSU Congress underlined the fact that questions associated with the task of providing the country with a reliable national defense remain continuously within the party's field of view. The interests of preserving the peace and of increasing the security of the Soviet state require further improvement of its Armed Forces and their fighting efficiency.

Implementation of congress decisions and fulfillment of Eleventh Five-Year Plan targets will insure the growth of the country's economic potential and maintain the USSR's defensive strength at the required level.

The high level at which our armed forces are now technically equipped impose serious demands upon the quality of the training and preparation our youth receive for their service in the Soviet Armed Forces. Today's complex military weapons and equipment will respond only to people with adequate general education and technical training.

The basic military training which, in accordance with the USSR law on the universal military obligation, young men undergo in their general educational schools, technicums, vocational and technical schools and enterprise, institutional and kolkhoz training centers prior to their call-up for army service plays an important role in this respect. Practical experience shows that young people who have undergone this training find their place among the army ranks more quickly and are more successful in mastering the use of military weapons and equipment. The schools and DOSAAF clubs are providing our future fighting men with good training and preparation.

Thanks to the CPSU's continuous concern, our Armed Forces now dispose of everything they need to repel any aggressor. Soviet fighting men are always prepared honorably to discharge their patriotic and international duty.

#### In Rural Areas

Moscow SOVETSKIY PATRIOT in Russian 11 Nov 81 p 2

[Article by A. Grigor'yev, DOSAAF oblast committee chairman: "In Rural Defense Society Organizations, Do Effective, Good-Quality Work"]

[Text] One in five of our primary organizations is either a kolkhoz or a sovkhoz organization. A substantial number of our school and institutional defense collectives are essentially linked to a rural area: some 45 per cent of the population of Voronezhskaya Oblast lives in the country.

This is why the DOSAAF oblast committee and its personnel and activists give no less attention to their rural defense collectives than they do to city-based organizations. If anything, the opposite would likely be the case. It has become our regular practice during meetings of the obkom presidium to discuss the work of our rural rayon organizations and primary defense collectives. To these meetings we also usually invite chairmen of rural DOSAAF raykoms who are not members of the presidum as well as representatives of the largest kolkhoz and sovkhoz primary organizations.

As a rule, obkom personnel and a group of activists will make a preliminary visit to one of these organizations. Over the course of several days they will make an on-site study of the state of affairs in this particular collective, prepare necessary recommendations and meet with personnel of the party raykom and rayispolkom. Full studies

have recently been conducted in the Semiluki, Kantemirovka, Khokhol'skiy and Ostrogozhsk DOSAAF rayon organizations.

The level of activity of primary defense organizations in rural areas has risen substantially, particularly on our kolkhozes and sovkhozes. Their activity is becoming an integral component part of the overall public political life of many labor collectives.

The DOSAAF primary organization on Opyt Sovkhoz in Podgorenskiy Rayon, led by F. Shepelev, may serve as an example of a vigorous mass-scale defense program in a rural area. It works in close association with members of the Komsomol (more than half the workers on the sovkhoz are young people). There is consequently a high level of organized sports activity here. Thirty-seven rated sprotsmen have been trained in technical and applied-military sports. There are shooting, automobile, motorcycle and multi-event applied-military sports teams.

A speakers group set up in association with the DOSAAF committee participates actively in the military-patriotic indoctrination of the young people here. The group, composed of 12 people, is headed by the director of the local secondary school, V. Glushchenko.

Help from the administration and support from the sovkhoz party committee have contributed to the construction of a good stadium, a 50-meter firing range and a man-made reservoir for qualifying in accordance with GTO norm requirements. The committee has a good material base. Motorcycle and tractor drivers are trained and retraining provided for transport vehicle drivers.

The oblast committee has carefully studied the experience this primary organization has accumulated and applauded these DOSAAF members' desire during the new five-year-plan period to achieve substantial improvement in their mass-defense and military-patriotic activities. We have recently prepared and put out for mass-scale distribution a poster publicizing the successes this front-rank defense collective has achieved.

Also achieving good results with their activities are the primary organization on Tikhyy Don Kolkhoz in Ostrogozhskiy Rayon headed by A. Polekvechnykh and defense collectives on the Frunze and Gor'kiy kolkhozes.

Each passing year sees an increase in the number of our rural schools. This is also creating favorable conditions for conducting mass-scale defense work among the students.

The DOSAAF organizations in our schools are essentially student collectives and so naturally require continuous support on the part of the rayon and oblast committees. When oblast committee personnel visit the rayons they are always interested to see what kind of assistance the raykom is rendering the school-based DOSAAF collectives, particularly those in the rural areas.

We are giving serious attention to improving our work with young people. The experience accumulated by the Pavlovskiy raykom is noteworthy in this respect. Members here have involved so-called problem children in activities associated with the STK [technical sports program]; they have organized instruction for them covering the automobile, the motorcycle, maps and radio. Many of these young people have now become active members of the club and good sportsmen. A public radio club is now active within the rayon, and a good training material base has been created.

In light of decisions of the 26th CPSU Congress and the CPSU Central Committee decree, "Further Improvement of Ideological and Political Indoctrination," the DOSAAF obkom in cooperation with the CPSU oblast committee has developed a long-range plan involving the DOSAAF organizations of Voronezh city as sponsors of mass-scale defense work in the nearest rural population centers. This plan is now being put into effect. Primary organizations in a number of the city's large enterprises and institutes have been enlisted in this sponsorship effort. The latter is to encompass more than 30 villages and settlements in Ramonskiy, Nizhnedevitskiy, Novousmanskiy, Khokhol'skiy, Verkhnekhavskiy, Kashirskiy and other rayons.

Plant STK involve the training of public judges and instructors in technical and applied military sports for working with these sponsored defense collectives. Assistance has been rendered in equipping clubs and setting up school corners and display stands dealing with mass defense activities as well as stands devoted to heroes of the Great Patriotic War. Members of the lecturers group appear regularly before rural DOSAAF organizations with discussions, lectures and reports on military patriotic subjects.

Selection, instruction and indoctrination of raykom chair cadres and committee chairmen of rural primary organizations occupy an important place in our work in directing the activities of rural raykoms.

We conduct regular meetings and seminars with raykom chairmen, instructors and other staff personnel.

It has become our practice once each year to hold meetings of the chairmen of rayon committees and major primary party organizations in the rural locations themselves. We have already held meetings like this in Kalacheyevskiy and Pavlovskiy Rayons. The first secretaries of the party raykoms and committee chairmen of kolkhoz and sovkhoz primary organizations speak to participants in these meetings.

The rural Verkhnemamonskiy Rayon committee recently hosted three-day meetings for raykom chairmen. Meeting participants familiarized themselves with the organization of mass defense work on the Strana Sovetov and Zarya kommunizma kolkhozes.

The development of socialist competition to its maximum potential is coming to acquire great importance in the effort to raise the level of rural rayon defense organization activity. The oblast committee regularly discusses the progress of socialist competition at the rayon organization level. Based upon the results of the past year, the Verkhnemamonskiy, Kalacheyevskiy and Petropavlovskiy organizations were among the winners in rural rayon socialist competition. According to preliminary results for the first 9 months of this year, these rayons are again among the leaders.

In speaking of socialist competition, I want to emphasize the importance of vigorous efforts to avoid the purely formal approach to the organization and direction of these competitions. We are unfortunately seeing no few instances in which a good show and hot air come to replace genuine concern for increasing the effectiveness of competition.

In some cases we will still find people trotting out a single set of stock obligations containing the same items year after year, the only difference being the year in which these obligations are undertaken. Progress in the fulfillment of obligations which have been undertaken is still inadequately monitored. The fact is that the same rayons are to be found among those lagging behind (Aninskiy, Kashirskiy, Liskinskiy and Nizhnedevitskiy Rayons).

The oblast committee is taking steps to rectify the situation in these rayons: obkom personnel along with our activists are visiting them more frequently and questions bearing upon improvement of mass defense activities are being raised and discussed with the support of local party and soviet organs.

In a word, we have done a lot to improve the performance of our rural defense organizations. We have nevertheless to put forth still greater efforts to bring rural mass defense work into line with present-day requirements.

#### CC DOSAAF Discusses Tasks Ahead

Moscow SOVETSKIY PATRIOT in Russian 25 Nov 81 p 1

[Article: "In the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee"]

[Text] The presidium of the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee met in regular session and discussed current questions bearing upon the defense society's activities.

During this session the presidium discussed questions concerning the meeting of the 7th plenum of the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee. It approved the reports "Tasks of DOSAAF Organizations Pursuant to the Decree of the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers 'Increase Mass Involvement in Physical Culture and Sports'" and "The Work of the Presidium and the Presidium Bureau during the Period between the 6th and 7th Plenums of the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee." It also approved drafts of plenum decrees dealing with these questions.

The presidium of the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee discussed the question "Current Status and Measures to Improve Ideological Indoctrination Activity with Members of the Permanent Staffs of Soviet Training Organization in Light of Requirements Imposed by the 26th CPSU Congress." It was pointed out that under the direction of party and soviet organs, defense society committees have already taken a number of steps to improve work with the cadres of training organizations and to increase their responsibility for the quality of training provided specialists for the USSR Armed Forces and our national economy.

Defense society organizations in the Ukrainian, Armenian and Lithuanian SSRs, Moscow city, Khabarovskiy Kray and Volgogradskaya, Rostovskaya, Tul'skaya and a number of other oblasts in the Russian Federation are distinguishing themselves as among those having the best records in work with full-time school personnel.

At the same time, the presidium session underscored the fact that the performance of many training organization committees and leaders in connection with the training and indoctrination of full-time personnel has yet to measure up entirely to requirements flowing from decisions of the 26th CPSU Congress.

A number of committees are giving inadequate attention to study of the practical and moral-political qualities of school directors, their deputies and the instructional staff. Some instructors and on-the-job-training supervisors do not fully measure up to requirements imposed upon this category of personnel.

Inadequately consistent efforts are being undertaken to develop high moral-volitional and psychological qualities in flight instructional staff.

A number of committees and training organizations are being slow to meet requirements contained in the decree of the CPSU Central Committee, the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, the USSR Council of Ministers and the AUCCTU, "Tightening Labor Discipline and Reducing Cadre Turnover within the National Economy."

Some committees and training organizations still demonstrate poor performance discipline; the assistance they are rendering is not yet at the required levels, and they are not properly organizing their efforts in connection with checking and monitoring progress toward fulfillment of requirements imposed by both their own and USSR DOSAAF Central Committee decisions.

In conformity with requirements set forth in the CPSU Central Committee decree "Improving Ideological and Political Indoctrination," the presidium of the central committee, USSR DOSAAF, has directed the DOSAAF central committees of the union republics and the kray and oblast committees to prepare and implement concrete measures to improve the quality and effectiveness of the training and indoctrination given the full-time personnel of schools and DOSAAF clubs. Ideological and political indoctrination given senior cadres, instructors and supervisors of schools and clubs should concentrate primarily upon thorough study of the materials of the 26th CPSU Congress, the decree of the November (1981) plenum of the party central committee, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev's speech at the plenum and mobilization for accomplishment of defense society tasks.

Attention was directed to the need to enlarge the role of socialist competition among full-time personnel, improve practices employed in totalling results of efforts undertaken to fulfill socialist obligations and in connection with the application of moral and material incentives and to develop creative on-the-job initiative in instructors and supervisors.

It is suggested that committees and leaders of training organizations work consistently to improve procedures associated with the selection and assignment of cadres and to organize stable pedagogical collectives.

On the basis of a report by the DOSAAF central committee of the Turkmen SSR and material gathered in the course of an investigation, a decree was adopted entitled "Practical Measures to be Taken by the DOSAAF Central Committee of the Turkmen SSR to Raise the Level of Activity of DOSAAF Primary Organizations in Higher and Specialized Secondary Educational Institutions pursuant to Requirements Imposed by the 8th All-Union DOSAAF Congress." It is suggested that, taking guidance from requirements imposed by the 26th CPSU Congress and the decree of the November (1981) party central committee plenum, the republic DOSAAF central and oblast committees take the steps necessary to improve the performance of DOSAAF primary organizations in higher and specialized secondary educational institutions and the supervision and direction they provide these organizations.

Jointly with trade union, Komsomol and other public organizations and departments work for the active participation of VUZ and technicum youth in the all-Union competitive review for Komsomol and DOSAAF primary organizations and the examination for conscripts and registrants covering their physical and technical military training, the all-Union expedition taking Komsomol and other youth to sites of historical revolutionary, military or labor importance to the Communist Party and Soviet people, the Komsomol's Orlonok military sports game and the traditional months and weeks of mass defense activities. Increase the responsibility of senior DOSAAF committee cadres for the status of these activities within primary defense collectives.

Organize technical groups and sections in all educational institutions with the objective of involving vocational-technical school and university students more extensively in technical and applied-military sports activities. Give special attention to the development of such sports as shooting, motorcycling, driving, parachuting, modeling and multi-activity applied-military sports events.

Work for substantial improvement of the material, equipment and facilities at the disposal of VUZ and technicum primary organizations and the organization of technical sports clubs in the largest of these organizations.

It is suggested that the union-republic DOSAAF central committees and kray and oblast committees give more attention to military-patriotic, mass defense and sports activities in the primary organizations of higher and specialized secondary educational institutions. Take additional steps to improve the style of leadership provided the primary organizations of educational institutions, strengthen their material-technical base and intensify their activity in light of requirements imposed by the 26th CPSU Congress.

It is recommended that there be active participation in efforts to set up divisions for mass defense organizers within all VUZ faculties for the public professions. Insure implementation of requirements set forth in the decree of the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers of 7 May 1966 and of the 8th All-Union DOSAAF Congress on mandatory training in one of the technical military specialties for VUZ students not undergoing military training.

The presidium discussed and approved a five-year plan of capital construction for the period 1981-1985. It is recommended that the DOSAAF central committees of the union republics and the kray and oblast DOSAAF committees concentrate their capital investment and material resources upon projects scheduled for completion in 1982 with a view toward putting these facilities into service on schedule and reducing the volume of unfinished construction and develop concrete measures to insure fulfillment of targets established by the five-year plan, giving particular attention to the completion of carry-over projects and efficient utilization of training facilities and production capacities brought into service.

The presidium approved the long-term plan outlining the work of the presidium of the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee for 1982.

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## PERCEPTIONS, VIEWS, COMMENTS

### VIEWS ON DEVELOPMENT PROSPECTS OF SOCIALIST-ORIENTED COUNTRIES

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 7, Apr 82 (signed to press 19 Mar 82) pp 85-90.

[Article by Docent and Candidate of Historical Sciences Yu. Trkhin: "The Socialist-Oriented Nations: Problems and Prospects of Development"]

[Text] A characteristic trait in the present stage of the world revolutionary process is the broadening and deepening of the struggle by the Asian, African and Latin American peoples against imperialism and reaction and for a socialist future. The report by the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, at the 26th CPSU Congress pointed out: "The revolutionary struggle of peoples has been marked by new victories. Proof of this is the revolutions in Ethiopia, Afghanistan and Nicaragua and the overthrow of the antipopular, monarchical regime in Iran. In the 1970's, the elimination of the colonial empires was actually completed."

The forum of the Soviet communists analyzed the distinguishing features in the development of the liberated nations at the beginning of the 1980's. The Accountability Report of the CPSU Central Committee pointed to the deepening process of sociopolitical differentiation among the young national states. After liberation some nations have followed the revolutionary-democratic path. In others capitalist relations have been established. Some of them conduct a truly independent policy while others are presently following in the channel of imperialist policy.

The materials of our party's 26th Congress mention the increased political role on the world scene of the young states, many of which have set as their goal development in the direction toward socialism. The socialist-oriented nations comprise the vanguard of the modern national-liberation movement. Their number is growing. The ranks of these nations which arose in the 1960's (Algeria, Burma, Guinea-Conakry, Democratic Yemen, the Congo, Tanzania and others) in the last decade have added Angola, Afghanistan, Benin, Guinea-Bissau, Madagascar, Mozambique and Ethiopia. A broad zone of socialist-oriented states has formed with a population of around 150 million persons and a territory exceeding 12 million km<sup>2</sup>. The largest number of them, over ten, is in Africa. They are responsible for 30 percent of the territory and almost 25 percent of the continent's population.

The 26th CPSU Congress made an important contribution to studying the essence and development patterns of the socialist-oriented states. The Accountability Report

of the CPSU Central Committee and the speeches given at the congress by the delegation leaders from the revolutionary-democratic parties of Asia, Africa and Latin America provided a clear class description for the nations which have selected the capitalist path and mention was made of the general trend of their development toward socialism. This conclusion is a convincing reply to all attempts by bourgeois ideologists and revisionists to depict the socialist orientation of the liberated nations as a certain "third path."

The socialist-oriented states must not be identified with the socialist states. As yet they are not carrying out socialist tasks but rather basically general democratic ones. In the socialist-oriented nations the leading force is the revolutionary democratic parties and not the Marxist-Leninist type parties as is the case in the socialist states. Power in the socialist-oriented nations belongs to the revolutionary democracy which expresses the interests of the developing working class, the peasantry, intelligentsia, white collar personnel, the petty and national bourgeoisie. This is not a state of the dictatorship of the proletariat as is the case with a direct transition to socialism. Obviously a socially oriented state must carry out a large amount of preliminary work involving a fundamental reorganization of the economy, society and the awareness of people before conditions for socialist transformations occur. The essence of a socialist orientation is in the implementing of anti-imperialist, anti-feudal, democratic transformations aimed at rapidly and revolutionarily creating the material, scientific-technical, socio-political and cultural prerequisites for a transition to socialism.

The materials of the 26th CPSU Congress state that the development of the socialist-oriented states is occurring in a varied manner. But the basic directions are similar. These are: the gradual elimination of the positions of the imperialist monopolies, the local large bourgeoisie and feudal lords and the limiting of the activities of foreign capital. It means the providing of commanding heights for the national state in the economy and the transition to the planned development of the productive forces and the encouraging of the cooperative movement in the countryside. It means an increased role played by the working masses in social life and the gradual strengthening of the state apparatus by national cadres loyal to the people. This means an anti-imperialist nature of the foreign policy of these countries. In them the revolutionary parties which express the interests of the broad masses of workers are growing stronger.

The representatives of the revolutionary-democratic forces at the 26th CPSU Congress gave exceptionally high praise to the analyses of processes contained in the ~~26th~~ Congress materials and relating to their socialist orientation. The General Secretary of the Central Committee of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan and the Chairman of the Revolutionary Council of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, Babrak Karmal, pointed out: "The Accountability Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 26th Party Congress formulated the basic, most essential patterns of development in the liberated nations of a new, progressive society which meets the aspirations and fundamental interests of the broad working masses."

The delegation leaders from the communist and revolutionary-democratic parties emphasized that the thorough analysis of the development of the liberated nations as given at the 26th CPSU Congress is of exceptional value for the revolutionary parties in

Asia and Africa. Many of these parties which have recently becoming ruling ones are greatly in need of a theoretical elucidation of the prospects of a socialist orientation.

The Asian and African peoples who for long years lived under the yoke of the colonial system created by imperialism from their own experience know what capitalism is, a system of violence and exploitation. The former colonies are hundreds of years behind the capitalist nations in their economic development. Per capita income in the liberated nations is 10-24 fold less than in the industrially developed capitalist nations, while average life expectancy in them does not even reach 30 years. The working peasantry, white collar personnel and artisans comprise the basic mass of the population. The developing nations, as a rule, are specialized in the production or output of a certain type of product (rubber, cocoa, oil, cotton and so forth) and for this reason depend completely upon the arbitrariness of the monopolistic importers. A significant portion of the population in these nations is illiterate and deprived of permanent medical aid.

The experience in the development of people from the former colonies over the last 20 years convincingly shows that it is possible to overcome the difficult heritage of the past, to achieve economic independence, to solve social problems by a truly democratic way and ensure the involvement of the workers in the running of the state only by a socialist-oriented path. In the countries which have selected this path, particular attention is given to the struggle for economic independence and the roots of the economic dominance of imperialism are being cut off more deeply and decisively than in the other young states. The state sector in the economy is being strengthened as the foreign monopolies as well as the enterprises of the local upper and middle bourgeoisie are nationalized in the countries oriented toward socialism. Thus, in Ethiopia, in the middle of the 1970's the basic foreign and local banks, the insurance companies, the large and medium-sized factories were nationalized. The state sector of Ethiopian industry numbers 143 enterprises and its share in the total output of industrial product in the nation exceeds 80 percent. Private entrepreneurs in Ethiopia can own only small industrial or trade enterprises.

In the PDRY [People's Democratic Republic of Yemen], in the 1970's the state nationalized all foreign banks and insurance companies, the large and medium-sized industrial enterprises and seagoing vessels and in 1977, also the oil refinery belonging to British Petroleum. After this the share of the state sector in the industry of the PDRY exceeded 90 percent. In Algeria the foreign oil companies, the production of electric power, the mining, oil-gas and a number of other industrial sectors have been nationalized. The rapidly developing state sector is presently responsible for 90 percent of the nation's industrial product. In Angola, the state now controls the shipyards, an oil refinery with a capacity of several million tons of oil products a year (it previously belonged to a Belgian oil company), the metalworking, steelcasting and fish processing industries, the cement plants, the coffee, sugar and textile companies. The state holds leading positions in the DIAMANG diamond mining company which prior to the revolution was controlled by five foreign imperialist monopolies.

Control over the economy and finances makes it possible for the socialist-oriented nations to change over to the planned management of the national economy and this helps to create an independent and efficient economy as well as raise the standard of living of the workers. Here the experience of planning in the USSR is widely used.

For example, the PDRY has already carried out a three-year development plan (from 1972 through 1974) and a five-year one (from 1975 through 1979) and in the course of implementing these scores of industrial enterprises were built. The directives for the Second Five-Year Plan (1979-1983) envisage the construction of a mineral fertilizer plant, electric power capacity, the training and skill improvement of workers. The volume of industrial production over the Five-Year Plan in cost terms will rise by over two-fold. In Ethiopia over the last 6 years industrial production has increased by 73 percent. Over the years which have passed since the overthrow of the feudal-monarchic regime in this nation, ten million persons have been taught to read and write and hundreds of schools and hospitals have been built.

A development pattern in the socialist-oriented states is the carrying out of agrarian reform in the interests of the working peasantry, with its direct participation in the changes. For example, in Ethiopia all rural lands and forests in 1975 were declared to be the property of the people and were redistributed between the landless and small land-owning peasantry without compensation for the former owners. The maximum size of a plot for one family should not exceed ten hectares. In the PDRY, the lands and property of the former sultans, sheikhs and large landowners reverted to state ownership in 1970 without compensation. In this nation the amount of land which can be owned is limited to 16 hectares per family on irrigated land. As a total the landowners lost 90,000 hectares which were distributed among 40,000 families. In accord with the agrarian reform decree in Afghanistan adopted after the April revolution, the limit to land owning for one family was set at six hectares of first quality land (that is, fertile and irrigated). Surpluses were to be confiscated without compensation and distributed among the landless and small land-owning peasants. During the first stage of agrarian reform, around 300,000 peasants received over 600,000 hectares of land.

The socialist-oriented states in every possible way are contributing to the development of the cooperative sector in the countryside. Thus, in the PDRY around 40 state farms and more than 50 cooperatives have been organized and these produce over 60 percent of the agricultural product for the nation. In Ethiopia there are 540 production cooperatives and 3,400 consumer cooperatives which bring together 4.8 million rural worker families. There are also 32 state farms which raise cereals, cotton and fruit crops. In the Congo more than 200 cooperatives and 20 large state farms are engaged in the production of coffee, sugar and vegetables. In Angola there are several thousand various peasant associations with around 1.5 million working members. It is important to point out that on the state farms and cooperatives the harvest, as a rule, is higher than on the privately owned farms.

Characteristic of the socialist-oriented nations is an increased role of the working masses in social life and the strengthening of the state apparatus with national cadres loyal to the people. These nations are organizing fundamentally new governing bodies (people's councils in the PDRY and Congo, assemblies in Angola and Mozambique, city women's and peasant associations in Ethiopia) while the former state administrative bodies are assuming a new, revolutionary content.

In 1978-1981, Angola, Mozambique, the Congo, Benin and the PDRY held elections for the supreme organs of power and in these the revolutionary ruling parties received the support of a predominant number of voters. Representatives of the workers and the progressive forces were elected to the organs of power. Thus, among the 203 deputies

of the People's Assembly of Angola elected at the end of 1980, 58 were workers, 48 were peasants and 20 were military. Among the 62 deputies who are members of the ruling MPLA--Labor Party, 19 were members of the youth organization, 26 were members of the National Union of Workers and 13 belonged to the Angolan Women's Organization. In the National Revolutionary Assembly of Benin, of the 336 seats, 33 are held by workers, 84 by peasants, 64 by representatives of the worker organizations, 33 are servicemen and 62 are workers of the state apparatus and institutions. Candidates are chosen to the supreme and local organs of power in a truly democratic situation at general meetings.

The state is the main implement for constructing a new society in the socialist-oriented states. It adopts revolutionary laws and exercises control over the changes in all areas of life. The role of the state and the political system is constantly growing as the tasks on the path of advance toward socialism become more complex.

The army is a component part of the socialist-oriented states and it is organized on revolutionary principles. The soldiers and officers are indoctrinated in a spirit of patriotism and are reliable defenders of the victories of the revolution. Socio-political disciplines have been introduced into the course of required training for the personnel. The servicemen have been given the right to participate in elections. They are involved in solving the problems of economic construction. They are building roads, erecting bridges and schools and helping in irrigation and reclamation work. The army is also aided by the detachments of people's militia and the voluntary detachments for the defense of the revolution which have been organized in certain socialist-oriented nations. Thus, during the aggression of Somalia against Ethiopia in 1977, the detachments of the Ethiopian people's militia which included around 600,000 men, along with the army, defended the frontiers of their motherland. In Afghanistan, volunteer detachments are aiding the people's army in the struggle against the bandits and saboteurs sent into Afghanistan from Pakistani territory. The leading political pattern in the development of the socialist-oriented states is the formation and strengthening of revolutionary parties which express the fundamental interests of the workers. Experience shows that the most successful development along a path of social orientation is realized where the progressive forces are able to create revolutionary parties of workers which adopt the basic principles of Marxism-Leninism. These revolutionary parties of the vanguard type bring together primarily the supporters of socialism. Scientific communism is proclaimed as the ideological basis of such parties and democratic centralism is the basic organizational principle. There are representatives of the working class and peasantry in the vanguard revolutionary parties. Admission to these parties is carried out on an individual basis by going through 1 or 2 years of a trial period with the subsequent discussion of the candidacy at a party meeting. Party cells are organized at industrial enterprises, in institutions, cooperatives and army subunits. Vanguard revolutionary workers parties exist in a number of socialist-oriented nations. These include Yemen Socialist Party (YSP), the Congolese Labor Party (CPT), FRELIMO in Mozambique, the MPLA--Labor Party in Angola and the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA). In 1979, a Commission for the Organization of a Worker's Party was set up in Ethiopia.

The vanguard revolutionary workers parties are growing and becoming stronger. The MPLA-PT now has 1,340 party cells while the number of members and candidate members is 31,000. One half of them is workers and peasants. From 1975-1978, the YSP grew

by 12.5 percent and it has around 26,000 members. FRELIMO has 35,000 members, the CPT has around 7,000 and the PDPA over 50,000.

The organization of the vanguard revolutionary workers parties is the result of an analysis by revolutionary democracy of the historical experience of the CPSU and the other Marxist-Leninist parties in the socialist nations and of an understanding of the international importance of Lenin's teachings on the need to create a political organization for the working class in the struggle to build socialism. As the members of the vanguard parties master Marxism-Leninism and as the cadre proletariat increases in them, over the long run these parties can grow into Marxist-Leninist ones.

An objective necessity of creating the vanguard revolutionary workers parties is that a socialist orientation, in representing a specific process of converting economically backward peoples to socialism requires a high scientific level of political leadership. Under these conditions only a vanguard party which is guided by Marxism-Leninism understands the laws of social development and sees the path of their embodiment in life can successfully direct the process of converting the liberated nations to socialism. Only they are capable of organizing and leading the broad masses of workers for actively participating in building a new life. Only they can oppose the intrigues of the domestic and foreign reaction.

The vanguard workers parties represent the nucleus of the political system in the socialist-oriented nations. They elaborate the strategy and tactics for the development of their nations, they direct the activities of the state and social organizations, they lead the process of economic and cultural development, they indoctrinate the working masses in a spirit of patriotism and internationalism and determine foreign policy. Under the central committees of the vanguard revolutionary parties they have organized party or political schools in which the students study scientific communism and the history of revolutionary movements. These include the Higher School for Scientific Socialism in Aden, the Central Party School in Mozambique, the Social Sciences Institute Under the PDPA Central Committee in Kabul, the Party School in Luanda and others. For example, in the PDRY 10,000 persons have completed the Higher School of Scientific Socialism and over the last three years more than 2,200 persons have been trained in the Angolan party schools.

The states which have chosen a socialist orientation are encountering definite difficulties of an objective and subjective nature. Certainly they are starting to build a new society under extremely complex conditions, when they not only lack specialists but even literate people, and when virtually everything must be done for the first time: organize cooperatives and state farms, plan and manage, direct and indoctrinate. As the social transformations grow deeper the resistance of the internal reaction grows stronger and here support is received from imperialism. In a number of instances, imperialism, having lost any hope of undermining one or another socialist-oriented state from within, resorts to outright intervention.

Imperialism is putting greater pressure on virtually all the nations which have chosen a socialist orientation, it is conducting subversive activites against them and is endeavoring to fan racial and intertribal hostility. The General Secretary of the YSP Central Committee and Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme People's Council, the Prime Minister of the PDRY, Ali Nasir Muhammad, has pointed out that imperialism is conducting a policy "from a position of strength" vis-a-vis the nations which have

chosen the path of socialist development. "On the Arabian Peninsula and in the zone of the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean," he said, "the imperialists are resorting to various forms of pressure on the nations and peoples of this region of the world. They are threatening to occupy the oil fields, they are creating bases here, they are sending their navies here and are conducting provocative military maneuvers on land, at sea and in the air. They are doing everything to eliminate the progressive regimes in Democratic Yemen, Ethiopia and Afghanistan."

In endeavoring to retain the liberated nations as a source of raw materials, the imperialists in every possible way are obstructing the construction there of modern industrial enterprises which could become the basis for creating an independent economy.

The imperialist monopolies are broadening the exporting of capital to the young national states in the aim of obtaining superprofits and further enslaving the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America. The total debt of the developing nations to the former metropolitan areas by 1981 had reached the enormous amount of 580 billion dollars. In 1970-1978, for each dollar invested into the developing nations the international monopolies received an average of 2.4 dollars of income. U.S. monopolistic capital over this period exported 8.7 billion dollars to the liberated nations but received back 39 billion dollars of profit.

The chairman of the Commission for the Organization of the Ethiopian Workers Party and the head of the Provisional Military Administrative Council of Socialist Ethiopia, Haile-Mariam Mengistu, in one of his speeches emphasized that the imperialists, being unable to win a victory over socialism in an open battle, are endeavoring to restore their rule in those nations which recently opted for a path of true independence and progress. For achieving this goal the imperialist predators are resorting to various stratagems. They are endeavoring to weaken and gain control over the economy of the nations which at a price of enormous sacrifice won independence and began to build a new life. For undermining the policy of peaceful coexistence, the ruling circles of the imperialist states, primarily the United States, are using reactionary regimes in a struggle against progressive national states. Day and night the Western intelligence agencies hatch intrigues in order to destabilize the situation in the socialist-oriented nations and in every possible way support the reactionaries on the loose.

Many leaders of the revolutionary-democratic parties have unmasked and decisively condemned the treacherous, subversive policy of the Maoist circles in Beijing vis-a-vis the countries which have chosen a socialist orientation. The Beijing leadership in fact is acting as the supporter and ally of imperialism in the struggle against these nations and the national liberation movements in various regions of our world.

Recently there has been a sharp rise in the aggressiveness of American imperialism and its subversive activity vis-a-vis the socialist-oriented nations. Visible proof of this is the broadening of the undeclared war against Afghanistan, the incursion by imperialist mercenaries on the territory of the sovereign Republic of the Seychelles Islands, the blackmail and threats against Libya, Mozambique and Democratic Yemen. Armed aggression by South Africa against Angola is continuing and this is being carried out with outright support from Washington. As a result of this aggression, thousands of peaceful inhabitants have died and more than 150,000 persons have been left without shelter. Enormous damage estimated at hundreds of millions of dollars

has been caused to the national economy. The South African troops are still occupying a significant portion of the southern Angolan province of Kunene. The South African racist regime, in being encouraged by the present U.S. Administration, is endeavoring to intimidate and demoralize the Angolan population in order to force it to abandon its socialist choice and solidarity with the fraternal peoples in neighboring Namibia which is occupied by South Africa.

The member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee and Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, N. A. Tikhonov, in speaking during a recent visit to the USSR by a party and governmental delegation from Angola headed by the Politburo Member and Secretary of the Central Committee of the MPLA--Labor Party, L. Lara, commented: "The overt, unceasing aggression by the racist regime of Pretoria against Angola, the support by the imperialists for the counterrevolutionary UNITA bands, and the slanderous fabrications by Western propaganda about the supposedly existing 'Soviet threat' to the south of Africa--all these are links in a broad conspiracy by international imperialism. The aim of this conspiracy is clear, that is, to intimidate the people of the young states, to return them to the sphere of its influence and to force them to abandon support for the just struggle by the Namibian people for their liberation.

Behind all of this one can clearly trace the hand of American imperialism which is encouraging greater militarization and nuclear preparations by the South African racists."

As a result of the Soviet-Angolan talks in Moscow in January 1982, a program for economic and technical cooperation was signed as well as a trade program for 1981-1985 and for the period up to 1990. A joint communique was adopted. The participants in the talks in a most decisive manner condemned the aggression by the South African racists against Angola and demanded an immediate withdrawal of the South African troops from Angolan territory. They emphasized that the broadening of interventionist actions by South Africa was a component part in increasing the activities of the most adventuristic forces of the world. The present support for the actions of Pretoria by Washington, including the use of a veto in the UN Security Council comprises a part of the U.S. aggressive global strategy aimed against the national liberation movement and the forces of democracy and socialism. The Soviet Union reaffirmed its solidarity with the just struggle of the Angolan people and confirmed its obligations stemming from the Treaty on Friendship and Cooperation Between the USSR and Angola. The USSR is providing all-round support for Angola as well as for the other "frontline states" and the national liberation movement in the south of Africa.

Of major significance in creating favorable conditions for the successful advance along the path of progressive socioeconomic changes have been the Soviet initiatives on the strict and full observance in relations between all states of the principle of equality and the generally accepted standards of international law as advanced by Comrade L. I. Brezhnev in April 1981 during a visit by the head of Libya M. Qadhafi to the USSR. The observance of these standards means at present approximately the following:

- 1) A recognition of the right for each people itself, without outside interference, to settle its own internal affairs; the abandoning of attempts to establish any forms of rule or hegemony over them or to include them in the "sphere of interests" of any state;

- 2) Strict respect for the territorial integrity of these nations and the inviolability of their frontiers; no outside support for any separatist movements aimed at breaking up these nations;
- 3) Unconditional recognition of the right of each African, Asian and Latin American state to equal participation in international life and to develop relations with any nations of the world;
- 4) The complete and unconditional recognition of the sovereignty of these states over their natural resources as well as de facto recognition of their complete equality in international-economic relations; support for their efforts aimed at eliminating the remnants of colonialism and the eradicating of racism and apartheid in accord with the well-known UN provisions;
- 5) Respect for the status of nonalignment chosen by a majority of the African, Asian and Latin American states and the abandoning of attempts to involve them in the military-political blocs of the states.

These initiatives are a development of the course of the 26th CPSU Congress to strengthen the relations of our country with the socialist-oriented states and at further developing and strengthening the alliance of world socialism and the national liberation movement.

Under the conditions of the increased aggressiveness of imperialism, of particular importance for the liberated nations is the development and strengthening of all-round cooperation with the world socialist commonwealth. A strong alliance with the nations of real socialism represents a dependable guarantee for the independent development of the young national states and serves as their support in strengthening progressive social changes. It plays an important role also in the effective resistance against the aggressive intrigues of imperialist reaction.

The USSR and other socialist nations maintain friendly relations with many developing nations. These ties have grown noticeably wider and deeper in the 1970's. While in 1962, the CEMA nations provided economic and scientific-technical assistance to 34 liberated nations, at present the figure is already 92.

With the aid of the socialist states the developing countries have built around 3,300 industrial enterprises and other projects. In many cases such projects have become the basis for national industrial development. The CPSU maintains regular ties with the ruling revolutionary parties in the socialist-oriented countries. This helps to acquaint the revolutionary parties with the rich experience of the CPSU and with the practices of real socialism. The USSR has concluded treaties of friendship and co-operation with Angola, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Afghanistan, the Congo, Democratic Yemen and Syria. The USSR provides aid to the socialist-oriented nations also in strengthening their defense capability.

The rebuff of the expansionistic plans of imperialism and a decisive struggle for the preservation of peace and social progress are a common cause, an international task of the socialist-oriented states and the socialist commonwealth nations. The alliance of world communism and the national liberation movement is a great victory for the peoples struggling against imperialism and for national and social liberation, for socialism and communism.

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